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HAS CONDUCT IN IRAQ CONFIRMED THE 
MORAL INADEQUACY OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW?  EXAMINING THE 
CONFLUENCE BETWEEN CONTRACT 
THEORY AND THE SCOPE OF CIVILIAN 
IMMUNITY DURING ARMED CONFLICT 
SAMUEL VINCENT JONES* 
INTRODUCTION 
It is 11:00 A.M. on June 15, 2003, in Fallujah, Iraq.1  The stench 
of bloody corpses reveals the effects of U.S. army rocket fire within 
the Iraqi town.  The rockets nearly demolished an entire building and 
killed approximately two hundred people, many of whom were 
women and children.  All of the dead are clad in civilian clothes, and 
there is no evidence of a uniformed soldier among the dead.  Media 
reports capture vivid scenes of relatives crying over corpses and 
charred children’s toys.  The images drive home the realization that 
small children and babies are among the dead.  Human rights 
activists, newspaper editors, and anti-war critics immediately 
characterize the incident as an example of U.S. noncompliance with 
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 1. Hypothetical scenario. 
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International Humanitarian Law (IHL).2  Few observers, if any, 
consider that the attack may have been lawful.  On the contrary, the 
civilian casualties, in the opinion of most observers, are a result of 
illegal conduct on the part of the United States during its occupation 
of Iraq. 
Knowledge of the circumstances preceding the attack, however, 
might prompt many observers to reach a different conclusion.  Three 
hours before the collapse of the building that killed the men, women, 
and children, a team of fifteen British soldiers responded to a report 
that armed insurgents3 were kidnapping young boys between the ages 
of nine and fourteen from their homes at gunpoint.  The insurgents 
savagely beat and left for dead any boy or adult who resisted.  
Consistent with their duties under IHL,4 the British soldiers 
proceeded to the scene to restore order and provide medical aid. 
When the soldiers arrived on the scene, the streets appeared calm.  
Two Iraqi men selling fruit and a boy, who purportedly had witnessed 
the incidents, told the soldiers of a badly beaten mother who had 
tried to protect her son.  These informants told the soldiers that the 
woman was bleeding inside a taxicab.  When the soldiers located the 
cab, the driver waved a white flag and threw his hands into the air.  
As the team approached, the vehicle exploded, instantly killing three 
of the soldiers. 
 
 2. In the context of this Article, “International Humanitarian law” is the contemporary 
expression for that part of international law regulating the conduct of hostilities.  It also is 
commonly referred to as the “law of armed conflict” and “law of war.” 
 3. The term “insurgent,” as used in this Article, refers to those persons who do not form 
part of an organized army and are not recognized by any international body.  Instead, they 
constitute a resistance fighting force that conducts clandestine and sporadic offensive operations 
against occupying armies in occupied territories.  As applied in the context of the U.S.-led 
occupation in Iraq, the term “insurgent” includes the reported twenty thousand resistance 
fighters, most of whom are Iraqis, currently exacting violence against the peaceful Iraqi civilian 
populace and coalition forces in Iraq.  See Paul Reynolds, Iraq Two Years On: Endgame or 
Unending War, BBC NEWS, Apr. 6, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/ 
4413121.stm (reporting insurgency strength at approximately “20,000”); see also General John 
Abizaid, Commander, U.S. Central Command, Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Oct. 2, 
2005) (transcript available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9542948) (stating during an 
interview with Tim Russert that “there’s no more than 20,000 insurgents in Iraq” and 
acknowledging that foreign fighters have “killed well over 5,000” innocent Iraqi civilians in 
2005). 
 4. Annex to the Convention: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, art. 43, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter HR or Hague Regulations], reprinted in 
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 80-81 (Richard Guelff & Adam Roberts eds., 3d ed., 2000).  
This Article assumes that at the time of the incident described in the introduction, the U.S.-led 
coalition forces in Iraq were occupiers.  The incident occurred weeks before the legal question 
regarding occupation status was put to rest in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546. 
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Unbeknownst to the soldiers, the cab had been rigged with 
explosives controlled by a remote detonator.  Seconds after the 
explosion, a civilian vehicle sped toward the soldiers, and its 
passengers immediately opened fire on them.  The soldiers entered a 
small house for protection.  They noticed that they were receiving a 
barrage of fire from several positions in the building facing them.  Six 
of the soldiers were badly wounded.  The team, which was grossly 
outgunned, estimated that they were fighting roughly a hundred 
armed insurgents. 
The leader recognized the gravity of the situation and advised his 
commander of the attack via radio, saying that he expected to be 
overrun in ten to fifteen minutes. Approximately five minutes later, a 
U.S. army helicopter that had been conducting a separate mission 
nearby arrived on the scene to assist the British soldiers.  The U.S. 
pilot identified the multiple rocket and machine-gun positions used 
by the insurgents.  Given the insurgents’ superior firepower and the 
likelihood that the British soldiers trapped inside the small building 
would not survive much longer, the pilot fired rockets into the 
foundational pillars of the building housing the insurgents, causing 
the entire front half of the building to collapse.  The insurgent fire 
stopped immediately. 
Unknown to the helicopter pilot, but widely known to the 
insurgents, there were uninvolved men, women, and children inside 
the building that the insurgents were using as their firing position.  
After the British team escaped with their wounded and dead, a 
Middle Eastern news agency publicized the effects of the helicopter 
attack and reported the incident as another U.S.-led atrocity.  The 
ensuing public outrage manifested in the form of demonstrations and 
demands that the American pilot be tried for war crimes.  The U.S. 
response was that the destruction of the building was justified by the 
military necessity of the situation, and that the insurgents bore the 
blame for the incidental lost of innocent civilian lives.  The military’s 
internal investigation of the incident exonerated the pilot of any 
wrongdoing.  Some commentators noted that, even if it had not been 
necessary to destroy the building, the pilot’s conduct was not a war 
crime because the helicopter attack could be considered a reprisal 
against “terrorists” (suspected) responsible for the 9/11 attacks or, 
more immediately, the illegal ambush against the British soldiers. 
The aforementioned hypothetical scenario epitomizes the type of 
situations that occupying armies like those of the United States and 
the United Kingdom encounter nearly every day, and will continue to 
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encounter.  This Article examines whether the juridical construct 
governing conduct under conditions encountered in present-day Iraq 
is adequately positioned to protect the innocent civilian populace.  
Policy concerns for the safety of civilians and resistance fighters has 
led to juridical symmetry between hostile and peaceful civilians and 
created incoherence between the aim of IHL and the juridical models 
used to achieve the goal of IHL. 
This Article posits that, while IHL relative to civilian immunity 
must be respected, securing its juridical goal of protecting the 
innocent from violence can only be attained by considering the 
impact of doctrinal models and abstract theories that inform norms 
during armed conflict.  The reality of the doctrine of military 
necessity and of the socio-contractarian aspects of hostilities prevent 
IHL from operating as a coherent framework.  IHL should be 
approached using coherence theory or by incorporating practical legal 
“reasoning from ends to appropriate means.”5  That is, in order to 
achieve juridical coherency, IHL must be applied to produce an 
outcome that is consistent with its overall aim or purpose of 
safeguarding the peaceful civilian populace. 
This Article argues that a refusal to accept coherence as a 
necessary value within international humanitarian jurisprudence 
hinders the restoration of law and order in occupied territories and 
significantly erodes well-established legal principles of distinction, 
blurring the line between hostile and peaceful civilians.  As a result, 
present-day armed conflict has begun to regress to an indiscriminate 
form of warfare, or as referred to by some, total war.  These 
conditions are adverse to the humanitarian principles designed to 
protect peaceful civilians and prevent excessive violence.  As evident 
by the armed conflict in Iraq, incoherency in current juridical models, 
such as Protocol I of the Geneva Convention, not only impedes an 
occupying army’s ability to protect peaceful civilians, but it also 
removes incentives for occupying forces to properly weigh the 
humanitarian objectives of IHL against the necessity of military 
attacks.  These circumstances have led to widespread global contempt 
for the U.S.-led occupying forces in Iraq, despite their attempts to 
comply with IHL and the insurgency’s continued use of treacherous 
measures of warfare. 
 
 5. John E. Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 869, 908 (2002). 
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Part I of this Article discusses the law of occupation and how the 
lawfulness of an occupation impacts the duty that the civilian 
populace in an occupied territory owes to the occupying power.  Part 
II addresses the scope and limitations of a civilian’s duty and rights 
regarding participation in hostilities and the degree to which 
incoherent and ambiguous juridical constructs create legal symmetry 
between insurgents and peaceful civilians and compromise the aims 
of IHL to minimize hardship and reduce violence to the civilian 
populace.  Part III discusses the application of the military necessity 
doctrine and how insurgencies and reductions in well established 
combatant—noncombatant distinction standards affect the 
proportionality analysis required under juridical constructs and 
cohere with the aim of IHL.  Part IV explores the socio-contractarian 
aspect of armed conflict and illustrates the normative influences and 
conditions by which adversaries deem themselves legally excused 
from certain legal obligations and within their rights to impose 
obligations upon their adversary to alter behavior.  In so doing, Part 
IV demonstrates the confluence between contract theory and the law 
and customs of armed conflict.  It addresses the legality of reprisals, 
the degree to which reprisals inform normative values within the 
civilian populace and how reprisals, despite their utility, may free the 
peaceful civilian from their duty to refrain from hostilities. 
This Article does not contend that the United States is an 
undeserving scapegoat for inefficiencies in the current models of 
international jurisprudence or propaganda—nor that it is not.  
Instead, this Article proposes, among other things, the idea that 
embedded in the seemingly thoughtless reactionary condemnation of 
the United States’ action in the hypothetical scenario is a 
presumption of U.S. noncompliance with IHL that is often falsely 
derived and inevitably hampers international juridical progression.  
The presumption arises from a lack of understanding of the 
exigencies of occupations, the strategies and theories of insurgencies, 
and the way incoherency in the law influences departures from well-
established legal principles of armed conflict and traditional notions 
of morality, all of which this Article seeks to explain. 
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I.  THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF A CIVILIAN IN AN 
OCCUPIED TERRITORY ARE NOT DETERMINED BY THE 
LEGALITY OF A HOSTILE NATION’S OCCUPATION 
A “territory is considered [legally] occupied when it is . . . placed 
under the authority of [a] hostile army,”6 and the occupation exists 
only in territories where that “authority has been established and can 
be exercised.”7  The fact-based transformation shapes the juridical 
personality of the parties and determines the legal duties each party 
owes to the other.8  There is no doubt that military occupations 
present a unique set of challenges for international jurisprudence.9  
Representative of this challenge is the establishment of a satisfactory 
standard that regulates the conduct between an occupying force 
determined to enforce its will and a civilian populace determined to 
resist.10  Although both treaty and customary laws of armed conflict 
make civilians immune from attack so long as they are not actively 
participating in hostilities,11 the obligations of the civilian populace to 
the occupier have been comparatively underdeveloped. 
 
 6. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND 
WARFARE ¶ 351, at 75 (1976), available at 
https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETInternet/Homepages/AC/CLAMO-
Public.nsf/0/588ce7fc87f2b21685256da40050f41d/Body/M2/LOWDocSupp.pdf?OpenElement 
[hereinafter FM 27-10] (citing HR, supra note 4, art. 42). 
 7. Id. 
 8. The United States’ occupation in Iraq may represent a deviation from long-established 
laws governing occupation. On June 8, 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed 
Resolution 1546, which declared an end to Iraq’s occupation and recognized the Interim 
Government of Iraq as the legitimate representative of the Iraqi people and embodiment of 
Iraqi sovereignty. S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4987 mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 
(2004).  Yet, Iraqi citizens in the province of Fallujah remained occupied when the United 
Nations Security Council passed the resolution that recognized the Iraqi Governing Council as 
the legitimate representative of all Iraqis, including those in Fallujah. Arguably, the occupying 
force had not sufficiently occupied Iraq to satisfy the legal standard in the Hague Regulations.  
The U.N. Security Council’s resolution might be construed by some to represent a revolutionary 
turn toward a more formalistic determination of occupation in lieu of the traditional fact-
specific determination promulgated under the Hague Regulations and in national military 
manuals such as FM 27-10, supra note 6, ¶ 355, at 76. 
 9. See GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945 315 (1994) (discussing military 
occupation in terms of the Israeli occupation). 
 10. Id. at 316 (noting that “there is simply no satisfactory way legally to regulate the 
relations between an occupying party determined to enforce his will and an occupied party 
determined to resist him”). 
 11. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 51, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, June 8, 1977 
[hereinafter Protocol I].  Protocol I is applicable in cases of international armed conflicts, and, 
by virtue of Articles 1(4) and 96(3), is also applicable between a party to Protocol I and “people 
fighting against alien occupation.”  Id., arts. 1(4), 96(3).  Neither the United States nor Iraq is a 
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The Hague Regulations are “completely silent on the far more 
important problem of armed resistance in occupied territory.”12  
Neither the subsequent Geneva Conventions of 1949 nor the 
Additional Protocols of 1977 explicitly ban a civilian in occupied 
territory from killing or attacking a combatant during occupation.13  
IHL does, however, authorize an occupying force to “subject the 
population of the occupied territory to provisions which are essential 
to enable the Occupying Power to fulfill its obligations under the 
present convention [and] to maintain the orderly government of the 
territory.”14  Once the occupier has properly published and enacted 
penal rules and other “provisions which are essential,” the civilian 
populace arguably owes the occupier a duty of peaceful conduct.15  
Military manuals, including those of two of the world’s major military 
powers, the United States16 and the United Kingdom,17 state the 
 
party to Protocol I. See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at 493-98 (offering a 
list of states that have signed Protocol I, which does not include the United States or Iraq).  
Nonetheless, many of the provisions of Protocol I are considered customary international law, 
and many of the countries that make up the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq are signatories to Protocol 
I, including the United Kingdom.  See Bradley Graham & Robin Wright, U.S. Works to Sustain 
Iraq Coalition; 4 Nations Have Left, 4 More Are Getting Ready to Leave International Force, 
WASH. POST, July 15, 2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/Articles/ 
A50417-2004Jul14.html (discussing coalition members that “have promised to significantly add 
to their contingents” in Iraq).  These circumstances, among others, make the provisions of 
Protocol I germane to the current discussion. 
 12. FRITS KALSHOVEN, THE LAW OF WARFARE: A SUMMARY OF ITS RECENT HISTORY 
AND TRENDS IN DEVELOPMENT 32 (1973). 
 13. BEST, supra note 9, at 193 (noting that the occupiers’ expectation that occupied people 
not indulge their inclination to resist is not “spelled out” in any of the relevant instruments).  In 
this context, relevant instruments refer to the Geneva Convention of 1949 and Additional 
Protocols of 1977; see  Protocol I, supra note 11; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II]; Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]; Geneva Convention Relative To The 
Treatment of Prisoner of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter 
Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3314, 75 U.N.T.S. 31. 
 14. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 13, arts. 64, 65. 
 15. See id. (stating that an occupying force may “subject the population of the occupied 
territory to provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfill its 
obligations . . . to maintain the orderly government [and] ensure the security of the Occupying 
Power”). 
 16. FM 27-10, supra note 6, ¶ 432, at 86 (“Subject to the restrictions imposed by 
international law, the occupant can demand and enforce from the inhabitants of occupied 
territory such obedience as may be necessary for the security of its forces, for the maintenance 
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civilian’s legal obligation to the occupier as one of peace and 
obedience. 
Factors that influence a civilian’s obedience to an occupier and 
the global community’s expectation of their obedience may be 
inextricably connected to factors outside of the individual 
combatant’s control.  Few would deny there is a growing sentiment 
that the extent to which an occupied civilian populace owes a duty of 
cooperation and obedience to an occupying force is dependant upon 
whether the occupation is legal.  The rationale extends from 
Rousseau’s philosophy that an occupying force should not be entitled 
to claim a right to obedience simply because it is the stronger of the 
involved military adversaries; there must be a duty to obey the 
occupier that arises independent of its relative strength.18  If the 
occupation is illegal, then the independent duty to obey cannot exist 
because the sole basis of obedience extends from the superior military 
might of the occupier in spite of the unlawful character of the 
occupation.19 
Adherents of this view therefore ask, in what sense can mere 
strength or force create a legal duty if that duty does not emanate 
from an independent legal source? The question is particularly 
 
of law and order, and for the proper administration of the country. It is the duty of the 
inhabitants to carry on their ordinary peaceful pursuits, to behave in an absolutely peaceful 
manner, to take no part whatever in the hostilities carried on, to refrain from all injurious acts 
toward the troops or in respect to their operations, and to render strict obedience to the orders 
of the occupant.”). 
 17. BEST, supra note 9, at 193 (“It is the duty of the inhabitants to behave in a peaceful 
manner, to carry on their ordinary pursuits as far as possible, to take no part in hostilities, to 
refrain from any act injurious to the troops of the Occupant or prejudicial to their operations, 
and to render obedience to the officials of the Occupant.  Any violation of this duty is 
punishable by the Occupant.”) (quoting THE LAW OF WAR ON LAND, BEING PART 3 OF THE 
MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW 552 (1958)). 
 18. See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 6-7 
(G.D.H. Cole trans., 1950). 
 19. See generally id. at 6-7. (“The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, 
unless he transforms strength into right, and obedience into duty . . . .  Force is a physical power, 
and I fail to see what moral effect it can have.  To yield to force is an act of necessity, not of 
will—at the most, an act of prudence . . . .  Suppose for a moment that this so-called ‘right’ 
exists. . .the sole result is a mass of inexplicable nonsense.  For, if force creates right, the effect 
changes with the cause: every force that is greater than the first succeeds to its right.  As soon as 
it is possible to disobey with impunity, disobedience is legitimate; and, the strongest being 
always in the right, the only thing that matters is to act so as to become the strongest.  But what 
kind of right is that which perishes when force fails?  If we must obey perforce, there is no need 
to obey because we ought; and if we are not forced to obey, we are under no obligation to do so.  
Clearly, the word ‘right’ adds nothing to force: in this connection, it means absolutely 
nothing . . . .  Let us then admit that force does not create right, and that we are obliged to obey 
only legitimate powers.”). 
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relevant when considering the current conflict in Iraq, given that 
some world leaders, including United Nations Secretary General Kofi 
Annan, have reportedly declared that the “U.S.-led war on  Iraq is 
illegal.”20  Noted IHL scholar, Hersch Lauterpacht, reasoned decades 
ago that a civilian’s “legal duty to obey” an occupying force is not 
conditioned upon international law.21 
Lauterpacht’s view is consistent with the well established 
understanding in IHL jurisprudence that jus ad bellum, the right to go 
to war, is distinct from jus in bello, conduct during war.22  Indeed, 
world powers decided the question regarding the relationship 
between civilian duty and the legality of an occupation decades ago.  
This position was adopted by the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg (IMT), which considered whether IHL imposed upon the 
occupied civilian populace of Greece and Yugoslavia a legal duty of 
obedience to the German army where Germany’s invasion was an 
illegal act of aggression.23  The IMT held that the provisions of IHL 
governing civilian conduct during occupation are unaffected by the 
legality, or lack thereof, of one nation’s attack upon another nation: 
At the outset we desire to point out that international law makes no 
distinction between a lawful and unlawful occupant in dealing with 
the respective duties of occupant and population in occupied 
territory. There is no reciprocal connection between the manner of 
the military occupation of territory and the rights and duties of the 
occupant and population to each other after the relationship has in 
fact been established. Whether the invasion was lawful or criminal 
is not an important factor in the consideration of this subject.24 
The IMT’s stance illustrates a near global expectation of a civilian’s 
strict compliance with the law regardless of an inhabitant’s viewpoint 
regarding an occupation. 
Whether one agrees with the IMT and Lauterpacht regarding a 
civilian’s duty to the occupier or finds relevance in the reported 
 
 20. Julian Borger & Ewan Macaskill, Iraq War was Illegal and Breached UN Charter, Says 
Annan, GUARDIAN, Sept. 16, 2004, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/law/ 
2004/0916illegal.htm. 
 21. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 438-39 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th 
ed. 1952) [hereinafter Lauterpacht]. 
 22. Derek Jinks, The Declining Significance Of POW Status, 45 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 367, 370 
n.10 (2004). 
 23. William V. O’Brien, The Meaning of ‘Military Necessity’ in International Law, 1 
WORLD POLITY: A YEARBOOK OF STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 
109, 145 n.2 (1957) (quoting NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, Trials of War Criminals  
1246-47  (1949-1951)). 
 24. Id. 
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statements of United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, it 
appears reasonably clear that civilians have, at a minimum, a certain 
duty to comply with IHL regardless of whether they believe an 
occupation is illegal.  Indeed, one of the foremost guiding principles 
of law is that every “citizen is deemed by the law to know the law,” 25 
as ignorance of the law “provides no excuse for unlawful conduct.” 26  
The principle is based “upon the equation of common law with 
common sense.”27 
The analysis advanced in the next segments of this Article is 
rooted in the proposition that IHL’s purpose is not to produce the 
total elimination of particular forms of conduct; but rather IHL’s 
more realistic purpose is to produce “some amelioration of the 
circumstances which combatants and non-combatants will confront 
should war break out.”28  IHL’s purpose “is to regulate hostilities in 
order to attenuate hardship.”29  The next Part of this Article broadly 
discusses the rights and duties that current juridical models of IHL 
impose on its subjects, and how the obligations and privileges that 
flow from IHL advance or inhibit its overall goal of civilian 
protectionism.  The focus in this section is not intended to question 
the extent to which civilians and combatants will obey or violate the 
law, but rather to illustrate through practical legal reasoning how 
incoherency in the law permits civilian and combatants to subvert the 
aim of IHL despite literal adherence to the conditions imposed by its 
construction. 
II.  CIVILIANS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ARE 
PRECLUDED FROM PARTICIPATING IN HOSTILITIES 
This Part discusses whether IHL precludes civilians from directly 
participating in hostilities, and how IHL enables or hinders civilian 
participation in hostilities.  In so doing, this Part relies principally 
upon two theoretical propositions regarding law and its impact on 
 
 25. PHILIP ALLOTT, THE HEALTH OF NATIONS: SOCIETY AND LAW BEYOND THE STATE 
37-38 (2002). 
 26. RELIGION, LAW, AND FREEDOM: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, at xvi (Yahya R. 
Kamalipour & Joel Thierstein eds., 2000). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Ramesh Thakur, Security in the new millennium, in ENHANCING GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A NEW DIPLOMACY? 268, 276 (Andrew F. Cooper et al. eds., 2002). 
 29. Beth Van Schaack, The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Convention’s Blind 
Spot, 106 YALE L. J. 2259, 2289 n.178 (1997) (citing Jean Pictet, International Humanitarian 
Law: Definition, in INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, at  xix (1988)). 
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conduct.  The first is Professor Ernest Dworkin’s formalist theory that 
any area of law, including IHL, must be coherent in order to be 
legitimate and justified.30  Coherence, in this context, is the “unity of 
the aspects of an area of law by means of a single, internal, integrated 
justification.”31  Law is coherent only if its doctrinal elements, 
institutional acts and structures are validated by some justification 
that integrates and unites those elements.32  Alternatively, the law 
may be coherent if “the doctrinal elements are justified by differing 
intermediate justifications, so long as those intermediate justifications 
are all justified and united by a single overarching justification, which 
thereby integrates the doctrinal aspects into a mutually supporting 
circle.”33  A legal system’s basic structural purpose is “implicit in any 
individual feature.”34  The justification or structural purpose that 
should be implicit in IHL juridical models is the safeguarding of 
civilians from excessive and unnecessary violence.35 
Second, inexplicit obligations and rights can be inferred “from 
the values underlying the explicit rules only if the explicit rules are 
coherent.”36  When explicit rules are incoherent, then the “principles 
and values” underlying them will also be “incoherent, or even 
contradictory.”37  This “incoherent or contradictory foundation would 
frustrate citizens’ attempts to successfully infer, . . . their inexplicit 
obligations and rights.”38  Each of the aforementioned theoretical 
frameworks informs the analysis offered not only in this section, but 
throughout the remainder of this Article.  This Part analyzes Protocol 
I with an eye towards determining the rights and obligations of 
civilians in occupied territory and illustrating the lack of coherency in 
its construct. 
 
 30. Ken Kress, Coherence and Formalism, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y  639, 646 (1993) 
(“[T]he political system can be legitimate only if its explicit rules are coherent.”). 
 31. Id. at 649. 
 32. Id. at 648-49. 
 33. Id. at 649. 
 34. Id. at 659 (quoting Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485, 
511 (1989)). 
 35. See, e.g., Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, The Eleventh Annual Waldemar A. Solf 
Lecture: The Changing Nature Of The Laws Of War, 156 MIL. L. REV. 30, 48 (1998) (stating that 
the majority in the Erdemoivic believed the purpose of IHL is the protection of the weak and 
vulnerable during armed conflict). 
 36. Kress, supra note 30, at 646. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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To determine the practical impact of IHL on a person in an 
occupied territory, it is first necessary to identify the person as either 
a combatant or a civilian.  These identity classifications are critical in 
assessing the person’s rights and privileges under IHL.  Combatants, 
as noted earlier, can be legally attacked.  Due to their status as 
combatants, they have the right to be granted prisoner-of-war status if 
captured39 and are immune from prosecution for killings that do not 
violate IHL.40  In contrast, civilians are immune from attack, as IHL 
forbids the intentional killing or targeting of a civilian if the civilian is 
not actively engaged in hostile acts.41 
One commentator observed that the rationale behind the 
separation of the two classes is that targeting any person other than a 
combatant would lead to indiscriminate or total war and produce 
widespread casualties among innocent civilians.42  A logical extension 
of this reasoning appears consistent with basic principles of morality 
and traditional notions of impartiality.  Therefore, determining who is 
properly considered a civilian (that is, one who is immune from 
attack) and who is a combatant (one who is privileged to kill and 
engage in attacks) is of obvious importance to complying with the law 
and maintaining one’s sense of justness and morality.  International 
bodies have looked to the definitional standards in Article 50 of 
Protocol I for authoritative guidance regarding who is legally entitled 
to civilian immunity.43  This Part will do the same. 
 
 39. Geneva Convention III, supra note 13, art. 4.A (stating that combatants are entitled to 
prisoner-of-war status if they: (1) are “commanded by a person responsible for his 
subordinates”; (2) wear a “distinctive sign recognizable at a distance”; (3) carry their arms 
openly; and (4) conduct “their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war”).  
The requirements are also set forth under HR art. 1.  See also id. arts. 96, 102. 
 40. Lauterpacht, supra note 21, at 338; Geneva Convention III, supra note 13, art. 99. 
 41. Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 51. 
 42. See KALSHOVEN, supra note 12, 38-39 (discussing indiscriminate attacks on residential 
quarters of industrial centers to attack the workers in the war industry (quasi-combatants) as 
leading to attacks on civilians generally). 
 43. LIESBETH ZEGVELD, ACCOUNTABILITY OF ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 75, 77, 80 (2002) (citing the ICTR and Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, Third Report on Colombia’s reliance on Article 50 of Protocol I when analyzing 
the definitional standard for the term, civilian, and fashioning a proper scope of civilian 
immunity). 
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Under Article 50(1) of Protocol I,44 a civilian is understood to be 
a person who does not qualify for protection under Article 4.A(1), 
(2), (3), and (6) of Geneva Convention III and Article 43 of Protocol 
I.45  The definitional stricture, therefore, grants civilian immunity to a 
person who is not part of an armed force and who does not qualify for 
prisoner-of-war status.46  The civilian immunity provisions of Protocol 
I do not explicitly require that the civilian refrain from engaging in 
hostile conduct.  The literal text of Protocol I permits a finding that 
civilian immunity evaporates only “for such time” as the person takes 
a “direct part in the hostilities,”47 and, according to at least one 
international body, immunity reattaches once the person has ceased 
direct participation in the hostilities.48 
Before addressing the problem created by Article 50(1), it should 
be understood that direct participation in hostilities, as the term 
hostilities is used in Protocol I, has been interpreted to be far 
narrower than a person’s general participation in the war effort.49 The 
latter encompasses efforts connected with the conduct of the war, 
whereas the former comprises behavior that can be described as the 
conduct of war, or, warfare.50  Hostilities would include, among other 
things, violent acts of psychological, economic, or military warfare.51  
General or indirect participation in the war effort, by contrast, would 
include the selling of food to a combatant or failing to prevent an 
attack by one of the adversaries.52  The latter category certainly does 
not strip a person of civilian immunity while the former does.  The 
 
 44. The United States has not ratified Protocol I, but considers some of its provisions 
acceptable practices, though not legally binding.  See Nathan A. Canestaro, Small Wars And The 
Law: Options For Prosecuting The Insurgents in Iraq, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 73, 105 
n.190 (2004).  See also Martin P. Dupuis et al., The Sixth Annual American Red Cross-
Washington College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law and the 1977 
Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT’L L & POL’Y 415, 420 
(1987) (statements by Department of State Legal Adviser, Mr. Michael J. Matheson, identifying 
Protocol I provisions that the United States recognizes as customary international law). 
 45. Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 50(1). 
 46. See id. arts. 43, 44, 50, 51 (As Article 44 governs prisoners of war, Article 43 governs 
members of armed forces, and Articles 50 and 51 govern protection of civilian populations, 
Protocol I purports to grant civilian immunity to people not in either of those categories.) 
 47. Id. art. 51(3); Protocol II, supra note 13, art. 13(3). 
 48. See ZEGVELD, supra note 43, at 75 n.49 (citing Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, Third Report on the Human Rights Situation  in Colombia, 84 ¶ 46, OEA/Ser.L/II.1, 
Doc. 9, rev. 1 (Feb. 29, 1999)). 
 49. KALSHOVEN, supra note 12, at 49. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 50. 
 52. ZEGVELD, supra note 43, at 76. 
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inquiry here is whether, by virtue of the initial grant of civilian 
immunity, civilians are legally required to refrain from directly 
participating in hostilities. 
Though not explicitly stated in Protocol I, noted commentators 
Hilaire McCoubrey and Jean Pictet contend that civilians, as people 
immune from attack, are precluded under IHL from taking direct 
part in hostilities.53  Other writers, such as Liesbeth Zegveld, dispute 
this contention, arguing that “civilians are not prohibited from 
participation in the hostilities.”54  Although the definitional strictures 
of Protocol I are ambiguous on this point, the former position offers 
more empirical promise, as it is more coherent with the reciprocal 
nature of armed conflict and the justification for IHL. 
It appears reasonably sound to conclude that, if civilians cannot 
legally be made the object of attack by combatants, then civilians 
should not be legally permitted to make combatants the object of 
attack.  Any rationalization to the contrary appears inconsistent with 
one of the most fundamental goals of IHL, which is to maintain two 
distinct classes.  J.M. Spaight, an early twentieth-century scholar, 
observed, “[t]he separation of armies [combatants] and peaceful 
inhabitants [civilians] into two distinct classes is perhaps the greatest 
triumph of International Law.  Its effect in mitigating the evils of war 
has been incalculable.”55  Indeed, the purpose of those rules is “to 
specify for each individual a single identity; [the person] must be 
either a [combatant] or a civilian.”56  The British Manual of Military 
Law illustrates this point with stark clarity: 
Both these classes [combatant or civilian] have distinct privileges, 
duties, and disabilities . . . an individual must definitely choose to 
 
 53. HILAIRE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: MODERN 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LIMITATION OF WARFARE 178 (2d ed. 1998) (“Nor may civilians 
themselves take a direct part in hostilities.”); JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 72 (1985) (reasoning that noncombatants “do not have 
the right to participate” in hostilities).  Also, the author recognizes the exception that 
inhabitants in non-occupied territories, who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take 
up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular 
armed units, are privileged to engage in hostilities provided they carry their arms openly and 
respect the laws and customs of war.  Geneva Convention III, supra note 13, art. 4.A(6). 
 54. ZEGVELD, supra note 43, at 76 (contending that “international practice” provides no 
support for any interpretation of IHL that civilians are obligated to refrain from directly 
participating in hostilities and that such an “obligation does not fit into the humanitarian law 
system”). 
 55. W. Hay Parks, Special Forces’ Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 493, 
514 (2003) (quoting J.M. SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 37 (1911)). 
 56. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 179 (3d ed. 1977). 
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belong to one class or the other, and shall not be permitted to enjoy 
the privileges of both; in particular . . . an individual [shall] not be 
allowed to kill or wound members of the army of the opposed 
nation and subsequently, if captured or in danger of life, pretend to 
be a peaceful citizen.57 
The excerpt underscores the expectation held by observers that 
civilians are not to engage in hostile acts.58  It also embraces at least 
one practical aim of the law, which is to maintain two distinct classes 
so as to minimize treacherous conduct in order to preserve traditional 
notions of justice and respect for life. 
Construing IHL, and more specifically, Protocol I, to authorize 
civilian participation in hostilities not only imbues Protocol I with the 
color of uselessness, it also precludes the treaty from being construed 
“as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme, [where] the 
operative words have a consistent meaning throughout.”59  Article 
50(1) of Protocol I, for instance, requires a combatant to assume that 
a person is a civilian if there is any doubt as to the person’s true 
status.60  An interpretation that allows civilians the right to participate 
in hostilities would nullify this rule because the rule presumes that 
civilians may not be attacked.  Therefore, an interpretation as such is 
implausible if the treaty grants civilians the right to participate in 
hostilities.  Moreover, such an interpretation impedes the restoration 
of law and order and effectively creates three identification 
classifications: peaceful civilians, hostile civilians, and combatants. 
A dual civilian classification scheme would encourage, rather 
than prevent, increased violence because it would legally permit a 
person to conduct attacks under the guise of being a peaceful civilian 
and regain their civilian immunity from attack after they have stowed 
away their weapons and returned to feigned peaceful conduct.61  Such 
situations lead to both civilian and occupying force casualties.  Dual 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. W. Hays Parks, Non-Combatant Immunity as a Norm of International Humanitarian 
Law, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 207, 217 (1994) (book review); Parks, supra note 55, 
at 514 (relying on Oppenheim for the proposition that “[h]ostile acts by private citizens are not 
lawful, and are punishable, in order to protect innocent civilians from harm.”). 
 59. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995). 
 60. Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 50(1) (stating, in part, that when there is doubt about 
“whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian”).  Similarly, “[i]n 
case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place 
of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective 
contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.” Id. art. 52(3). 
 61. Id. art. 51(3) (stating that “[c]ivilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, 
unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”). 
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civilian classification also results in public contempt for the occupying 
force combatants,62 despite the legality of their conduct, because it 
enhances a hostile person’s ability to operate undercover and conduct 
ambushes in order to create insecurity within an occupied territory.63  
An additional problem for the international legal community hoping 
to prevent total or indiscriminate war is that, when civilians decide to 
engage in hostile acts toward the occupier, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to identify them unless these persons distinguish 
themselves or are identified by peaceful civilians.64  Without proper 
distinction and classification standards, total war becomes imminent 
as these conditions enable insurgencies. 
As evidenced by the recent U.S.-led occupation of Iraq, the 
modern battlefield is replete with insurgents who typically wear 
civilian clothes rather than uniforms or distinctive insignia.65  They 
typically live or seek shelter within the civilian population and often 
maintain very close contact with the portion of the civilian population 
that sympathizes with them.66  Insurgents mobilize only a very small 
portion of the populace when they first begin their attacks.67  They 
organize mainly when they are facing a stronger, heavily armed force 
and attempt to make up for their inferior military capacity through 
clandestine operations and terrorism.68  But insurgents primarily 
depend on the counterattacks of the larger occupying force to 
mobilize the rest of the population;69 hence, they create situations in 
which the legitimate counterattack kills civilians, so that the ensuing 
public outcry and condemnation will strengthen the insurgents’ 
 
 62. Iraqi Town Protest at Bomb Blast, BBC NEWS, Mar. 1, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
1/hi/world/middle_east/4308529.stm; Over 150 Dead in Iraq in One of Deadliest Weekends Since 
U.S. Invasion, DEMOCRACY NOW, July 18, 2005, http://www.democracynow.org/Article.pl? 
sid=05/07/18/136254 [hereinafter DEMOCRACY NOW]. 
 63. PICTET, supra note 53, at 38-39. 
 64. KALSHOVEN, supra note 12, at 38-39. 
 65. See generally David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, War And The Law, IN THE 
NATIONAL INTEREST, Mar. 26, 2003, available at http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/ 
Articles/Vol2Issue12/vol2issue12rivkincaseypfv.html (noting press reports highlighted that the 
Iraqi Republican Guard and Ba’athist Party militia shed their uniforms and fired on Coalition 
Forces wearing civilian clothes). 
 66. DAOUD L. KHAIRALLAH, INSURRECTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 158 (1973); 
WALZER, supra note 56, at 179, 184. 
 67. Id. at 180. 
 68. PICTET, supra note 53, at 38-39. 
 69. WALZER, supra note 56, at 180. 
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cause.70  In sum, insurgents attack not only occupying forces, but also 
civilians.71 
A Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLF) pamphlet 
indicates that it is the people themselves who act as the driving force 
in armed conflicts.72  The NLF’s theory was that, if a state waged war 
against it, the state would be fighting against civilians, not a separate 
and distinct army, and therefore the state would be branded a killer 
of men, women, and children.73  Thus, more people would sympathize 
with and join the NLF, though it was the NLF that intentionally 
impeded distinction and increased the risk of harm to civilians.74  Put 
succinctly, the insurgent strategy is designed to place the onus of 
discriminate warfare on the occupying army while simultaneously 
doing everything within the insurgents’ power to make distinction 
impossible.75  This tactic endangers peaceful civilians. 
To minimize the occurrence of violence against innocent civilians 
during occupations, it appears imperative, as previously discussed, 
that international juridical models achieve at least two goals in 
protecting civilians from violence.  First, the law should permit 
civilian immunity only to those individuals who do not actively 
engage in hostilities at any time.  Second, the law should ensure that 
“distinction shall be made at all times between belligerents and the 
civilian population.”76  The latest amendments in IHL, which Protocol 
I represents, fails in both respects. 
The criteria by which insurgents should be required to 
distinguish themselves from civilians were debated in the drafting of 
Protocol I.77  Because of the presumption that there are certain 
 
 70. Id. at 179-80. 
 71. See Abizaid, supra note 3 (stating that insurgents have killed over 5000 innocent Iraqi 
civilians this year alone); Iraq Car Bombing Causes Carnage, BBC NEWS, Feb. 28, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4303629.stm; Fifty Bodies Found in Iraqi River, 
BBC NEWS, Apr. 21, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4465769.stm; Double 
Car Bombing Rocks Baghdad, BBC NEWS, Apr. 14, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
1/hi/world/middle_east/4443409.stm. 
 72. WALZER, supra note 56, at 180 (noting that “the entire people . . . are the driving 
force . . . . Not only the peasants in the rural areas, but the workers and laborers in the city, 
along with intellectuals, students, and businessmen have gone to fight the enemy.”). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. KALSHOVEN, supra note 12, at 28. 
 77. PICTET, supra note 53, at 38-39 (commenting on the concerns voiced at the Diplomatic 
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law 
Applicable to Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 1974–1977 (the “Diplomatic Conference”)). 
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situations during armed conflict in which insurgents cannot, without 
compromising their lives or the success of their operations, distinguish 
themselves from the civilian population, the decision was made to 
minimize distinction requirements.78  Stated differently, the classical 
view that distinction between civilians and combatants should always 
be observed was subordinated to the apparent social or political 
desires of certain nations to protect insurgents. 
According to some commentators, the changes were adopted to 
revise the long standing rule that only states can lawfully establish 
military forces and that lawful combatants must operate like regular 
forces in order to maintain lawful combatant status;79 and to make 
occupations more akin to domestic police actions rather than armed 
conflicts so that deadly force is used conservatively.80  One underlying 
goal was to promote the lawful status of irregular combatants or 
insurgents with hopes that they would, in turn, behave humanely and 
in accordance with IHL.81  It comes as no surprise that these 
modifications were adopted during the 1970s amidst global 
resentment over Israel’s hostilities with the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) 82 and United States’ involvement in Vietnam.83 
Under the old requirements, insurgents were granted combatant 
privileges if they complied with the requirements set forth under 
Article 4.A(2), Geneva Convention III,84 which mandated that 
combatants carry their arms openly.85  For example, the United States 
 
 78. PICTET, supra note 53, at 39. 
 79. David B. Rivkin & Lee A. Casey, Leashing the Dogs of War, THE NAT’L INTEREST 57, 
61 (Fall 2003). 
 80. Id. at 63. 
 81. Id. at 62 (“[M]any who have promoted a ‘lawful’ status for irregular combatants have 
done so in an effort to bring them ‘within the system’, in the hope that, once privileged, guerillas 
would behave in their own operations.”). 
 82. See HEATHER WILSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY NATIONAL 
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS 119 (1988) (stating that the Diplomatic Conference commenced in 
1974, the same year “liberation movements were first extended the privileges of observers in the 
General Assembly itself. In October of [1974] the General Assembly invited” the PLO, as 
representatives “of the Palestinian people, to participate in the deliberations of the General 
Assembly on the question of Palestine in plenary meetings”); Rivkin & Casey, supra note 79, at 
62 (“Protocol I, at least arguably, eliminates the requirement of government sanction for lawful 
combatant status, and the rules requiring uniforms and open carriage of arms are relaxed.”). 
 83. Rivkin & Casey, supra note 79, at 61. 
 84. Geneva Convention III, supra note 13, art. 4.A(2). 
 85. Id. (recognizing that militias and other volunteer armed opposition groups are entitled 
to prisoner-of-war status if they: (1) are “commanded by a person responsible for subordinates”; 
(2) wear a “distinctive sign recognizable at a distance”; (3) carry their arms openly; and (4) 
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recognized the Vietcong Main Forces and Local Forces as lawful 
combatants and granted them prisoner-of-war status upon capture 
despite being considered irregular “in the way in which they are 
raised and in the authority on which they depend.”86  Under the new 
formula relaxing the requirements for insurgents to acquire lawful 
combatant status, insurgents can gain such status even when they do 
not carry their arms openly, except during an attack and the 
deployment immediately preceding the attack.87 
As the opening scenario helps illustrate, one problem that arises 
immediately from this modification involves its practical effect.  The 
modification increases the insurgents’ capability to feign peaceful 
civilian status and use verbal communications to stage attacks against 
lawful unsuspecting combatants.  Indeed, the fruit vendors’ ability to 
deceive the British soldiers in the opening hypothetical was enhanced 
by their ability to pose as peaceful civilians.  The argument could be 
made that the reality of the modification has only a de minimus 
impact on conduct because insurgents do not always have access to 
arms as do regular military forces.  For instance, the fruit vendors 
could have spontaneously decided to pick up an abandoned weapon 
and join the attack against the British soldiers after deceiving them.  
With respect to those insurgents who do own arms, one view may be 
that the modification’s effect on conduct is insignificant because 
insurgents, arguably, will not comply with any law that requires them 
to carry their arms openly. 
Neither position dispels the ways in which Protocol I, at the very 
least, better enables insurgents to wage war.  By eliminating the legal 
requirement to carry arms openly–a measure designed to identify a 
person as a combatant–the modification impedes the restoration of 
law and order by legally protecting insurgents from being targeted or 
attacked except when preparing for an attack or conducting an attack.  
Protocol I arguably requires insurgents be treated as civilians when 
returning from an attack or planning an attack.88  The practical effect 
 
conduct “their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.”). These 
requirements are also set forth under HR, supra note 4, art. 1. 
 86. KALSHOVEN, supra note 12, at 48. 
 87. PICTET, supra note 53, at 39; Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 44(3). 
 88. See Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 51(3) (stating that civilians shall enjoy protection 
unless and for such a time as they directly participate in hostilities); see also Major Lisa Turner 
& Major Lynn Norton, Civilians At The Tip Of The Spear, 51 AIR FORCE L. REV. 1, 28 (2001) 
(noting that “a controversial provision of Additional Protocol I allows the civilian to regain his 
protection from attack when he ceases direct participation in hostilities”); Rivkin & Casey, 
supra note 79, at 62 (“Under Protocol I, irregular forces need to produce their arms and 
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of the weakening of the distinction requirements under Article 
4.A(2), Geneva Convention III, represents, at least by implication, 
approval of the notion that insurgents, like the fruit vendors in the 
opening scenario, are permitted to hide themselves within the civilian 
community and directly participate in hostilities while posing as 
civilians.89 
Indeed, the danger to peaceful civilians from cruel and wanton 
violence is not only increased when insurgents fight among peaceful 
civilians, but also when they fight while disguised as peaceful 
civilians.90  Without a proper means to distinguish insurgents from 
peaceful civilians or a satisfactory juridical model that permits 
insurgents to be subjected to attack and that requires them to 
distinguish themselves in the same fashion as occupying forces, 
circumstances will always arise that compel occupying forces to treat 
all civilians as potential threats.91  This condition not only serves the 
strategic aim of the insurgency, it represents incoherency between the 
justification of IHL and its construct.  The circumstance becomes all 
the more revealing when one considers the ambush in the opening 
scenario. 
Though some may support the ambush as a legitimate form of 
war under IHL, the ambush described in the opening scenario is 
nothing of the kind.  IHL makes a sharp distinction between 
treachery and the legitimate ruse.  On one hand, Article 23(b) of the 
Hague Regulations forbids a person to use treachery to wound or kill 
during an occupation.92  While, on the other hand, Article 24 of the 
Hague Regulations condones the use of ruses of war.93  Distinguishing 
between treachery, which is illegal, and ruses of war, which are legal, 
is not an easy task under IHL.94  The divergence helps illustrate why 
IHL, and more specifically Protocol I, cannot be construed to endorse 
civilian participation in hostilities. 
 
identifying badges only immediately before launching an attack, and can only be targeted 
themselves while preparing for an attack or attacking.  At all other times, Protocol I requires 
irregulars to be treated as civilians, who can be arrested, but not targeted.”). 
 89. See Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 44(3). 
 90. WALZER, supra note 56, at 184. 
 91. Susan Turley, Keeping the Peace: Do The Laws of War Apply? 73 TEX. L. REV. 139, 
164-65 (1994) (observing that where circumstances arise where civilian-clad people engage in 
combat activity against American Forces, the condition compels the American Troops to view 
“every civilian as a potential threat”). 
 92. KALSHOVEN, supra note 12, at 102. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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Surprise, for example, is an essential feature of both treachery 
and ruses.95  The concealment and camouflage involved in staging 
ambushes “has long been regarded as a legitimate form of combat”;96 
however, not all ambushes are lawful.  Surprise attacks that are 
launched behind the legal cover of noncombatant status, i.e., civilian 
status, rather than natural cover, are unacceptable.  The introductory 
scenario exemplifies this point. Recall that the insurgents were 
disguised as unarmed peaceful citizens who, when viewed as such, 
were legally immune from attack. It was because of their misuse of 
legal immunity, combined with the effect of the “doubt” requirements 
under Article 50(1) of Protocol I, that the insurgents achieved their 
goal elements of surprise ambush.97  The British soldiers thought they 
were coming to the aid of needy victims of violence. Instead, they 
were being trapped. 
The insurgents’ conduct, though quite effective for their 
purposes, was not a legally acceptable form of combat.  In fact, it was 
murder by means of treachery.98 Conduct is illegal if it betrays the 
enemy’s confidence that the person dressed as a civilian will not 
attack after the enemy has treated that person as a civilian.99  This 
rule, when read in tandem with the scheme of Protocol I, reinforces 
the viewpoint that civilians are not to engage in hostilities.  The ban 
against a civilian’s direct participation in hostilities fits squarely 
within the international humanitarian system.  One rationale for the 
rule is that the wearing of civilian clothes for treacherous purposes 
 
 95. WALZER, supra note 56, at 176. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 50(1) (stating, in part, that when there is doubt about 
“whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian”).  Some might 
argue that removal of the doubt requirement is necessary to prevent Protocol I from shielding 
insurgents from the consequences of their treacherous conduct of posing as civilians in order to 
launch attacks.  On one hand, such a revision would appear to lead to an increase in civilian 
casualties because combatants might relax their rules of engagements and start to injure or kill 
peaceful civilians they mistakenly presumed were hostile civilians or insurgents.  On the other 
hand, civilian casualties occur because of the continued presence of insurgents within the 
civilian community.  While the removal of the doubt requirement may expose the civilians to 
increased risk, it might compel peaceful civilians to take a personal stake in ridding their 
communities of insurgents or take personal steps to distinguish themselves from insurgents.  
This proactive response may ultimately result in decreased casualties for both civilians and 
occupying forces. 
 98. See WALZER, supra note 56, at 176-77. 
 99. KALSHOVEN, supra note 12, at 102-04. The long-established rule against using civilian 
attire for treacherous purposes is also codified in Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 37(1)(c). 
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increases the possibility that an enemy combatant may not “respect 
the civilian population.”100 
Although Article 37(1)(c) of Protocol I reiterates the long-
established rule against feigning civilian or noncombatant status to 
attack a combatant, Article 44(3) of Protocol I implicitly makes the 
well-settled requirement of combatant-noncombatant distinction 
discretionary,101 hence, compromising coherency.  As written, the 
latter rule enables insurgent activity by sanctioning the position that 
“there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of 
the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself.”102  
Nevertheless, in view of the violence resulting from treacherous 
conduct,103 practical legal reasoning, functioning as a subset of 
coherence theory, demands that IHL require every person to 
distinguish themselves from the civilian populace as a prerequisite to 
participating in hostilities. 
Indeed, one of the foremost challenges for the lawful combatant 
is enforcing IHL against people who will violate IHL in order to exact 
violence, whether by misusing internationally recognized protection 
signs, posing as peaceful civilians, misusing civilian objects as military 
objects, or conducting military operations within civilian populace.  
One practical effect that emanates from this circumstance is contempt 
for the occupier, arising from its perceived failure to protect peaceful 
civilians from harm. Even in situations where a lawful combatant is 
responsible for the actual harm or injury to a civilian, contempt for 
the combatant may be grossly misplaced where it is the adversary’s 
conduct that placed the civilians in harm’s way. 
 
 100. KALSHOVEN, supra note 12, at 104-05. 
 101. Protocol I, supra note 11, arts. 44(3), 37(1)(c). 
 102. Id. art. 44(3). 
 103. Treacherous conduct has also included incidents where a civilian-clad suicide bomber 
killed by exploding his taxicab, see Ben Montgomery, Local Soldier Dies in Suicide Attack, 
TIMES HERALD-RECORD, Mar. 31, 2003, available at http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:dnb 
AeaNHixYJ:www.recordonline.com/archive/2003/03/31/bmwrap31.htm+taxicab+killed+four+ir
aq&hl=en&ie=UTF-8.  Civilian-clad insurgents feigned surrender only to ambush U.S. service 
members as they approached.  See Dana Dillon, Perfidy in Iraq: Their Tactics, Our Response, 
THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Mar. 26 2003, http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ 
ed032603b.cfm.  Insurgents placed peaceful men, women, and children around probable targets 
to shield the targets from attack (a tactic generally known as using “human shields”).  See U.S. 
Forces Kill Human “Shield” Child in Iraq, ABC NEWS ONLINE, May 26, 2005, 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200505/s1378052.htm.  Non-distinguished persons used 
white flags to get close enough to U.S. forces to open fire on the soldiers.  See W. Hays Parks, 
Capitol Hill Hearing, Hearing on Iraq’s Violations of the Law of Armed Conflict, Apr. 4, 2003, 
available at http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/03-04-
04parks.html. 
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One of the best-known examples of this condition occurred 
during a February 13, 1990, attack on the Al-Firdus bunker during the 
Persian Gulf War.104  The bunker had been converted from an air raid 
shelter to a command and control bunker.105  The bunker was 
camouflaged, surrounded by barbed wire, and protected by Iraqi 
armed guards.106  Unbeknownst to U.S. military planners, Iraqi 
authorities permitted “several hundred civilians into the facility.”107  
This use of the bunker—which was a legitimate target for attack—
resulted in the deaths and serious injury of the civilians in the 
facility.108 
The Iraqi government had an obligation under IHL to refrain 
from “commingling its civilian population with what was an obvious 
military target.”109  Despite its obligation, the Iraqi government 
permitted civilians to dwell inside the compound, an action that led 
directly to the deaths of the civilians.110  Uninformed observers 
nonetheless summarily concluded that the civilian casualties were 
caused by U.S. noncompliance with IHL, rather than an Iraqi 
violation of the customarily accepted legal principles embodied in 
Article 58(a) of Protocol I.111  Either way, the calamity inspired broad 
public sympathy for the Iraqis and condemnation of the United 
States.  In short, the contempt for the occupier, which weaker armies 
and insurgents rely upon to strengthen their ranks was effected by the 
weaker force’s violations of IHL. 
Despite the legality of the attack on the Al-Firdus bunker, 
tragedies like it and others that stem from violations of IHL bolster 
the proposition that certain provisions of Protocol I do not comport 
with practical legal reasoning.  For example, Article 52(3) requires a 
combatant to presume that an object is non-threatening or civilian in 
 
 104. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: FINAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 615-617 (Apr. 1992), available at http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/ 
cpgw.pdf.  [hereinafter DOD Report]  (Reference can be found at 702.) 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 141. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 617 
 110. Id. 
 111. Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 58 (stating that “[t]he Parties to the conflict shall, to the 
maximum extent feasible: (a) without prejudice to Article 49 of the Fourth Convention, 
endeavor to remove the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their 
control from the vicinity of military objectives.”) 
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nature if there is any doubt.112  One practical objection to this 
requirement is that “[i]t shifts the burden for determining the precise 
use of an object from the party controlling that object” to the party 
attacking the object, when in fact the party controlling the object is in 
a far more informed position to determine its use.113 
Article 52(3) relaxes the distinction between insurgents and 
civilians.  This innovation encourages total war, undermines the law, 
and improves the insurgents’ strategic capacity.  Consequently, 
civilians are imperiled because insurgents are better able to disguise 
threatening behavior as civilian activity.114 
The by-product of the dreadful effects of this problem compels 
occupiers to assume less risk in exposing themselves to harm.  This 
result, wherein hostile and peaceful civilians are treated the same, 
cannot be said to be coherent with protecting innocent civilians from 
harm.  The helicopter pilot in the opening scenario exposed the 
civilians in the building to grave danger, though unintentionally, in his 
attempt to minimize the increased risk of harm to the British soldiers.  
As demonstrated in the following section, though the collapse of the 
building was a horrible incident, whether to assign liability to the pilot 
for a war crime requires an examination of the military necessity of 
the situation at the time of the attack. 
III.  A CIVILIAN’S RIGHT TO REMAIN DETACHED FROM 
HOSTILITIES SHOULD NOT BE VITIATED BY THE 
DOCTRINE OF MILITARY NECESSITY 
This section focuses more generally on the conduct of the 
occupier, rather than the civilian, in assessing the impact of Protocol I 
on the civilian’s right to be free from attack. More specifically, it 
posits that if one of the core aims of IHL is to protect civilians from 
the unnecessary violence uniquely characteristic of armed conflict, 
application of the doctrine of military necessity must cohere with this 
juridical goal.  As examined here, the proper application and 
assessment of military necessity is virtually impossible when there is 
no viable method for distinguishing hostile civilians or insurgents 
from innocent civilians.  Exacerbating the problem are the 
overreaching influences of politics, which often lead military 
 
 112. Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 52(3). 
 113. DOD Report, supra note 104, at 616. 
 114. WALZER, supra note 56, at 179-80. 
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commanders to take measures that increase civilian casualties even 
when there is no identification problem. 
Whether the harm to the civilian populace emanates from an 
inability to distinguish hostile civilians from peaceful ones or a need 
to satisfy the political objective of minimizing casualties among 
friendly forces by reducing exposure to risk, the end result is that 
civilians are harmed, albeit unintentionally.  This result is not only 
inconsistent with the aim of the IHL, but it also undermines the 
practical reasoning underlying the law proscribing civilian 
participation in hostilities.  Whether intentionally or mistakenly, 
conditions that give civilians the impression that they are being 
attacked raise the question as to whether they should continue to 
refrain from participating in hostilities.  To avoid this circumstance, 
the application of military necessity must comport with the goal of 
IHL to protect innocent civilians without exception. 
Dr. Francis Lieber, a former Columbia University law 
professor,115 and the author of the first “codification of the laws of 
land warfare,”116 drafted the most widely accepted theory of military 
necessity.  Dr. Lieber defined military necessity as “those measures 
which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which 
are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.”117  One of 
the best-known judicially reviewed examples of the broad nature of 
military necessity comes from the U.S. v. Wilhelm List et al. (the 
Hostage case), which was heard before the IMT.118  General Lothar 
Rendulic, commander of the Second Panzer Army in Yugoslavia,119 
was accused of implementing a “scorched-earth policy on an 
enormous scale, effected when the Germans withdrew from the 
 
 115. Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The Origins and Limits of 
the Principle of Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 213, 213-15 (1998). The Lieber definition 
appears to be analogous to the definition adopted in FM 27-10.  See FM 27-10, supra note 6, 
(defining military necessity as that “principle which justifies those measures not forbidden by 
international law which are indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as 
soon as possible”). 
 116. LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 19 (2002). 
 117. U.S. WAR DEPARTMENT, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE 
UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD, General Orders 100, art. 14 (Apr. 24, 1863), reprinted in 
Carnahan, supra note 115, at 215. 
 118. O’Brien, supra note 23, at 140; United States v. List  (the Hostage Case), TRIALS OF 
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL NO.10 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), case 7, reprinted in part in PETER 
MAGUIRE, LAW AND WAR: AN AMERICAN STORY 169-71 (2000). 
 119. Id. at 170. 
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Finmark region.”120  He was tried for “wanton destruction of cities, 
towns, villages or devastation not justified by military necessity.”121 
The IMT ruled that General Rendulic, who was “far from 
friendly territory and in grave danger of being cut off and annihilated 
by the Russian forces,” was justified in ordering the cruel devastation 
that left 61,000 civilian “men, women and children homeless, starving, 
and destitute.”122  The military result was that General Rendulic 
successfully prevented the Russian Army from overtaking his troops.  
The Germans were able to escape.  Although the facts revealed that 
the enormity of the devastation was not immediately necessary, the 
measures were taken to “obstruct the Russian advance and to deprive 
them of the use of the buildings, private property and human 
resources of the region.”123  Because the act appeared necessary to 
General Rendulic’s accomplishment of his military objective, the 
tribunal respected his judgment and “ruled that he had acted in 
accordance with Article 23(g) of the Hague Rules on Land 
Warfare.”124 
Although the Hostage case illustrates an application of military 
necessity where civilians were left homeless rather than killed or 
wounded, the case provides a sound example of its broad and 
discretionary application.  The broad nature of military necessity does 
not, however, obviate the need for a definite and foreseeable 
connection between the act committed and the alleged military 
necessity.  Dr. William O’Brien states “[i]t is not sufficient to claim 
that an act not directly related to a legitimate measure of warfare 
might contribute ultimately to the enemy’s defeat.”125  Had the 
Germans’ scorched earth tactics that destroyed huge areas of Russia 
been motivated by spite rather than military need imposed by the 
circumstances of their withdrawal, Rendulic’s acts of devastation 
would likely have constituted war crimes. 
Without the requirement that some military objective must exist 
to justify military necessity, the doctrine would be vulnerable to 
 
 120. O’Brien, supra note 23, at 140. 
 121. Id. (quoting Nuremberg Military Tribunal, Trials of War Criminals (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1950), at xi, 770). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id.; Article 23(g) forbids the destruction or seizure of “the enemy’s property, unless 
such destruction and seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.”  HR, supra 
note 4, art. 23(g). 
 125. O’Brien, supra note 23, at 141. 
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widespread abuse and unworthy of juridical value.126  Still, the 
seeming ease with which the doctrine may be invoked as a matter of 
convenience is a well-known criticism of the doctrine of military 
necessity.127  In this vein, questions arise regarding the extent to which 
a combatant is obligated to balance the necessity of an attack against 
the protection owed to civilians and civilian objects either when 
targeting objects such as the Al Firdus Bunker or buildings destroyed 
by General Rendulic. 
The basic rule is any damage to the civilian populace must be 
proportionate to the military objective.  The requirement for 
proportionality is designed to balance the competing priorities of 
humanitarian principles and military necessity.  Its core purpose is to 
safeguard civilians from unjustified risks by requiring combatants to 
weigh military and humanitarian values against one another.128  It is 
also designed to preclude combatants from conducting operations 
that will cause death or injury to civilians and civilian property that is 
excessive in relation to the military necessity.129  To satisfy this goal, a 
combatant is required to: (1) verify that the target is a military 
objective;130 (2) “take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimize 
collateral damage;” and (3) refrain from destroying a target if it is 
apparent that the destruction may be expected to cause excessive 
damage.131 
 
 126. REPORT OF THE AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION AND SALVAGE OF 
ARTISTIC MONUMENTS IN WAR AREAS 48-49 (1946) (recognizing the risk of military necessity 
being used for military convenience); see also Sarah Eagen, Preserving Cultural Property: Our 
Public Duty: A Look at How and Why We Must Create International Laws That Support 
International Action, 13 PACE INT’L L. REV. 407, 426 (2001) (noting that military necessity is 
sometimes used for personal convenience and, therefore, there is a potential for abuse when 
nations involve the concept of military necessity). 
 127. Id. at 426. 
 128. William J. Fenrick, Attacking the Enemy Civilian as a Punishable Offense, 7 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 539, 545 (1997). 
 129. Frits Kalshoven, as reported by Charles A. Allen, Implementing Limitations on the Use 
of Force: The Doctrine of Proportionality and Necessity, 86 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 39, 44 
(1992) [hereinafter Limitations]. 
 130. Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 52(2) defines military objectives as “those objects which 
by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and 
whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the 
time, offers a definite military advantage.”  What constitutes an “effective contribution to 
military action” and “definite military advantage” has led to much debate and ultimately 
inspired disputes over whether an object is, legally, a military object.  This discussion goes 
outside the scope of the present Article but will be addressed in a subsequent writing. 
 131. Limitations, supra note 129, at 44; Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 57. 
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Examination of the following situation will illustrate the 
application of the military necessity doctrine.  During the Persian 
Gulf War, the government of Iraq positioned two fighter aircraft 
adjacent to the ancient temple of Ur, on the theory that the U.S.-led 
coalition forces’ respect for the temple as a historical site would 
preclude an attack on the aircraft.132  As military objects, the planes 
were, of course, subject to attack, and the Iraqis were required by 
Article 27 of the Hague Regulations133 to keep the planes away from 
the temple of Ur and any other cultural artifacts.  The United States’ 
position was that the Iraqis should bear responsibility for any damage 
to the temple as they positioned the aircraft near the protected 
structure.134  Despite the military nature of the planes, the legal 
analysis did not end there.  According to U.S. commanders, the 
principle of proportionality demanded that they refrain from 
attacking the aircraft because U.S. intelligence indicated that the two 
planes were scarcely a military threat without servicing equipment 
and any nearby runway.135  Those conditions effectively took the two 
planes out of action, thereby limiting the military value of their 
destruction when weighed against the risk of damaging the temple.136  
The example shows that, though an object may be military in nature, 
its destruction, when weighed against humanitarian demands, may 
not be warranted. 
In considering humanitarian values, U.S. commanders weigh the 
expected collateral harm to civilians against the necessity of an attack 
either at the time of the attack or in view of the long-term military 
and political objectives of the entire campaign.137  Some 
commentators criticize the United States’ view based on the premise 
that the long-term strategic standpoint of military necessity ignores 
the fact that “civilian losses may be disproportionate to the 
 
 132. DOD Report, supra note 104, at 615. 
 133. Article 27 reads: 
In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as 
possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic 
monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided 
they are not being used at the time for military purposes. It is the duty of the besieged 
to indicate the presence of such buildings or places by distinctive and visible signs, 
which shall be notified to the enemy beforehand. 
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 27, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 
2277. 
 134. DOD Report, supra note 104, at 615. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. DOD Report, supra note 104, at 615. 
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immediate military goal to be achieved in any particular tactical 
attack.”138  Others commentators criticize the view on the ground that 
military necessity should apply only to battlefield conditions and 
should never take political objectives into consideration.139  Both 
views appear to take exception to the doctrine’s vulnerability to social 
policy, which this Article discusses shortly.  It is first necessary to 
understand the fundamental complexities involved in ensuring that 
the need for an attack is proportionate to the damage it causes. 
At first glance, it appears relatively elementary to “state that 
there must be an acceptable relation between the legitimate 
destructive effect and undesirable collateral effects.”140  Clearly, 
“bombing a refugee camp is obviously prohibited if its only military 
significance is that women in the camp are knitting socks for 
soldiers.”141  Conversely, an air strike on a large ammunition storage 
facility should not be prohibited because a single farmer is plowing 
nearby.142  Of course, during armed conflict, many situations arise that 
implicate a wide variety of options that could conceivably improve 
the odds of winning the conflict.  Most of these situations are not as 
clearly determinable as the aforementioned examples.  More often 
than not, balancing the demands of military necessity with 
humanitarian considerations is very complex and susceptible to 
subjective morality, bias, and reasoning.143  Indeed, an experienced 
human rights lawyer, who is a distant onlooker, is very likely to assess 
the collateral damage—loss of civilian life or property—in relation to 
the intended military necessity much differently than would a military 
commander who is responsible for winning the armed conflict.144  This 
reality lends credence to the proposition held by some that the 
humanitarian portion of the equation is seriously vitiated by 
subjectivity.145  This argument is not completely devoid of merit. 
 
 138. Dale Stephens, Human Rights and Armed Conflict—The Advisory Opinion of the 
International Court of Justice in Nuclear Weapons Case, 4 YALE HUM. RTS & DEV. L .J. 1, 20 
(2001) (attributing the remarks to Judith Gardem, Proportionality as a Restraint on the Use of 
Force, 20 AUSTL. Y. B. INT’L L. 161, 409 (1999)). 
 139. Carnahan, supra note 115, at 219. 
 140. Fenrick, supra note 128, at 545. 
 141. Id. at 545 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 546. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Stephens, supra note 138, at 20 (attributing the remarks to Judith Gardem, 
Proportionality as a Restraint on the Use of Force, 20 AUSTL. Y. B. INT’L L. 161, 409 (1999)). 
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The principle of proportionality, essentially, compels a 
combatant to assess the value of innocent human lives in relation to 
military need.146  The integrity and effectiveness of the analysis is, 
therefore, vulnerable to the vagaries of human reason: application of 
the principle is uniquely dependent upon the military commander’s 
concept of who the enemy is and where the enemy is located.  A 
commander cannot accurately consider collateral harm to a civilian if 
he perceives that person to be the enemy.  Therefore, ground 
conditions that create more difficulty in distinguishing innocent 
civilians from hostile civilians or insurgents logically increases the 
psychological value the commander will give to military need when 
assessing whether an attack on an objective is proportionate.  If a 
commander mistakes an innocent civilian for an insurgent, despite his 
best attempts to comply with the proportionality requirement, the 
operation will increase casualties among the innocent civilian 
populace. 
The dilemma is further exacerbated by the language of Article 
51, which permits insurgents to abuse the presumption of innocence 
or peacefulness.  Indeed, when approaching the rule as strict 
textualists rather than from a coherent approach, the rule could 
reasonably be construed as authorizing civilians to engage in acts that 
negate their immunity, and then permit them to regain that immunity 
once they cease the wrongful conduct, provided they are not caught.147  
This condition so distorts the term civilian that the presumption of 
civilian innocence disappears in the face of hostility.  In the eyes of 
the combatant, Article 51 does nothing more than turn the civilian 
into a sniper by day and a legally immune citizen by night.  This 
consequence not only undermines the legitimacy of the law, it 
ultimately leads to total war, as self preservation compels combatants 
to expand the list of targets to be attacked in response to threats and 
internal casualties.148 
 
 146. Fenrick, supra note 128, at 546. 
 147. Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 51(3) (stating that “[c]ivilians shall enjoy the protection 
afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”). 
 148. Indeed, former Special Assistant for Law of War Matters to the U.S. Army Judge 
Advocate General W. Hays Parks urges that the Protocol I legal constraints governing the 
conduct of armed conflict are too restraining because they do not take into account a 
combatant’s need to destroy the war-sustaining capability of an enemy.  See W. Hays Parks, Air 
War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 140-46 (1990).  To that end, U.S. policy holds that 
bridges, railroads, seaports, highways, communication sites, and utility sites, though typically 
civilian in nature, may also be attacked if used for military purposes.  See DOD Report, supra 
note 104, at 613-16.  The reported U.S. attack on an Iraqi television station in order to stop the 
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The extent to which military commanders should expose their 
forces to danger in order to limit civilian casualties is difficult to 
determine, particularly in light of military commanders’ duty to limit 
casualties within their own forces—the most basic military necessity.149  
The Herculean challenge lies in the tension between a U.S. military 
commander’s duty under international law to minimize collateral 
damage and a commander’s duty under domestic law to protect U.S. 
troops against the risk of capture and harm.  Reducing the risk of 
harm to troops, though a widely accepted military practice, may 
increase the risk to civilians, albeit unintentionally.  Making the 
analysis exponentially more challenging are influences of political 
objectives on the proportionality equation. 
In Kosovo, for instance, an air commander required pilots on 
combat missions to fly above 15,000 feet so as to avoid Serbian air 
defense systems.150  The limitation reduced the risk of U.S. casualties 
and a costly aircraft shoot-down or prisoner-of-war incident that 
could have been politically damaging and might have jeopardized 
national interests.151  The mandate, however, increased the number of 
civilian casualties because the higher altitude made it more difficult 
for pilots to positively identify conditions on the ground before 
firing.152  Similarly, in February 2002, in Afghanistan, Central 
Intelligence Agency officers and U.S. Army officers attached to the 
U.S. Central Command watched as a Predator plane, flying thousands 
of feet above ground, captured images of a very tall man being 
treated very respectfully by his colleagues.153  The officers “agreed 
that the tall man could be Osama Bin Laden.”154  Minutes later, 
permission was granted, they fired.155  The attack devastated the area, 
 
Iraqi disinformation campaign illustrates the degree to which traditional civilian objects may 
become targets for attack in response to the realities of armed conflict.  See Amnesty Int’l, Iraq: 
Fear of War Crimes by both Sides, Mar. 26, 2003, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/ 
index/engmde140442003 (criticizing U.S. attack on Iraqi TV station); Patrick Martin, Media 
bosses admit pro-war bias in coverage of Iraq, WORLD SOCIALIST, May 2, 2003, 
http://www.wsws.org/Articles/2003/may2003/med-m02.shtml (commenting that BBC and CNN 
officials admitted that American broadcast media stations distorted the news and functioned as 
information distributors for the Pentagon and Bush Administration during the war in Iraq). 
 149. Fenrick, supra note 128, at 549. 
 150. Nathan A. Canestaro, Legal and Policy Constraints on the Conduct of Aerial Precision 
Warfare, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 431, 477 (2004) [hereinafter Legal and Policy Constraints]. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND 269 (2004) 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 269-70. 
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but the media later reported that the victims were merely local men 
scavenging the woods for scrap metal, not Osama Bin Laden.156 
The incident involving the killing of the three local men, and 
others like it, have been criticized as constituting summary executions 
in contravention of international law and for encouraging other 
nations to execute anyone they consider a terrorist.157  Despite the 
international criticism, incidents like the abovementioned military 
operations have been applauded by many Americans as “progress in 
the war against terrorism.”158  This circumstance symbolizes a growing 
divergence between humanitarian objectives and national policy that 
suggests political pressures have the tendency to manipulate the 
application of IHL as well as increase or decrease violence depending 
on the desired political outcome. 
Turning to the flight commander’s decision in Kosovo, the 
example provides a careful reminder of how political influences, in 
addition to regard for individual safety, affect the proportionality 
analysis.159  The commander was thinking not only of the impact of 
losing a pilot, but also of the long-term and political effects of having 
a plane shot down.  For instance, a captured pilot could give enemy 
forces international media notoriety and be used as a tool for 
advancing their demands.  Though his actions may have been within 
the letter of the proportionality rule, the outcome flowing from his 
actions hardly comports with the aim of IHL, which is to protect 
innocent civilians from the tragic effects of armed conflict.  Civilian 
safety, undoubtedly, was subordinated by political concerns, much the 
 
 156. Id. at 270.  It is noted that not all incidents involving the Predator have resulted in 
death.  During the U.S. conflict in Afghanistan, an American, unmanned aircraft known as the 
“Predator” “identified a group of cars and trucks fleeing the capital.” One of the cars was 
suspected of carrying Taliban leader Mullah Omar. The Predator followed the cars to a building 
where Omar and others were seeking refuge. Despite requests from fighter bombers, General 
Tommy Franks denied authority to fire because of the concerns expressed by his Judge 
Advocate General.  See Seymour M. Hersh, Annals of National Security: King’s Ransom, THE 
NEW YORKER, Oct. 22, 2001, available at http://www.hvk.org/Articles/1001/193.html.  The 
refusal led some officers to complain that they were being refused the right to strike targets 
because “of political pressure to avoid a bloody collateral damage incident that would publicly 
damage the campaign.” See Legal and Policy Constraints, supra note 150, at 478-79. 
 157. HERSH, supra note 153, at 268. 
 158. Id. at 268. 
 159. One of the best and most critical influences of political concerns upon battlefield 
operations reportedly occurred in Iraq, when military commanders halted major attacks 
designed to retake insurgent strongpoint cities such as Fallujah and Ramadi until after the U.S. 
presidential election. See Mark Mazzetti, Major assaults on hold until after U.S. Election, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2004, available at http://www.southcoasttoday.com/daily/10-04/10-11-
04/a02wn655.htm. 
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same way the ratifiers of Protocol I subordinated the traditional value 
of the combatant-noncombatant distinction when granting insurgents 
increased rights to operate during armed conflicts. 
In both instances, the means used to achieve the goals of the law 
did not produce a result that is coherent with the overall aim of the 
law.  Succinctly put, “[t]he reality of politics leaves the law untidy.”160  
Coherence theory, however, “minimize[s] the effect of politics.”161  It 
achieves this by functioning as a theory of practical reasoning from 
ends to means.162  That is to say, through analyzing IHL in a coherent, 
outcome-driven manner, obstacles to proper applications, such as 
literalism or politics are minimized.  Indeed, if one keeps focused on 
the aim of IHL, which is to protect civilians, a different outcome can 
be reasonably attained. 
This discussion should not be taken to imply, however, that 
commanders are legally free to make decisions based on their 
personal conceptions of fairness and individual biases.  Instead, the 
contention here is that the law, as written, permits too much 
vulnerability to flawed application.  Turning to the opening scenario, 
the pilot fired the rockets into the building because the insurgents 
were using the building to support multiple fighting positions.  In 
judging whether the helicopter pilot acted reasonably, a person must 
look at the situation through the lens of the pilot.163  The extent to 
which the pilot gathered available information and relied on the 
information acquired, as well as the accuracy of the information, are 
key factors in determining the reasonableness of his attack decision.164  
Other factors, such as time, available troops, and combat conditions, 
are also taken into account when assessing the reasonableness of 
decision to attack.165 
As previously stated, the helicopter pilot’s decision could have 
been guided by concern that if the British soldiers were captured, 
they might become hostages or be murdered on public television.  
Both results have tremendous political ramifications. Given the broad 
 
 160.   JOSEPH RAZ, The Relevance of Coherence, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 261, 
298 (1994). 
 161. Gerald J.Postema, Integrity: Justice in Workclothes, 82 IOWA L. REV. 821, 831 (1997). 
 162. Murray, supra note 5, at 908. 
 163. MAJOR KEITH E. PULS, LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK 2005: INTERNATIONAL AND 
OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT 167 (2005) (citing A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE 
BATTLEFIELD 66 (1996)). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
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nature of military necessity and the subjectivity of any proportionality 
assessment, though, other factors make the pilot’s action legally 
sound.  The pilot’s decision to fire into the foundation of the building 
to prevent the team of soldiers from being killed appears reasonable, 
as there was a military need to immediately suppress the insurgents’ 
fire upon the soldiers.  The pilot did not know that civilian men, 
women, and children were in the building when he fired at it, nor was 
there sufficient time for the helicopter team to ascertain the existence 
and number of peaceful civilians who may have been in the building 
being used by the insurgents to ambush the soldiers.  In sum, the 
pilot’s application of force, despite resulting in the unfortunate deaths 
of innocent civilians, did not constitute the outrageous conduct 
proscribed by the IMT.  The pilot did not destroy the building for 
revenge or out of spite.  On the contrary, the pilot made a reasonable 
decision in light of the immediate need to stop the attack on the 
British soldiers.  Had the pilot not acted as he did, the ground team 
would probably have been killed. 
Despite the media fixation on the results of the pilot’s rocket fire, 
the civilian deaths were the result of insurgent misuse of civilian 
objects and civilian attire.  The result is made possible by the 
previously discussed provisions of Protocol I.166  The insurgents 
evaded criticism, although it was their conduct that brought about the 
civilian deaths.  This result is incoherent with Protocol I’s underlying 
justification.  Application of the law and the means by which conduct 
complies with the law should produce an outcome that prevents 
treacherous conduct by insurgents rather than restrains the lawful 
military options available to occupiers seeking to restore order when 
threatened by treachery.  The quintessential task, therefore, is 
determining what an occupier can do to prevent insurgents from 
employing treacherous means of warfare that place innocent civilians 
in danger, so that there is coherency between the justification and 
outcome produced by implementation of IHL.  Some states have 
concluded that reprisals are the “only means” to compel a recalcitrant 
enemy to cease treacherous conduct during armed conflicts.167 
 
 166. See relevant Protocol provisions discussed supra notes 11, 13. 
 167. PICTET, supra note 53, at 67. 
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IV.  THE USE OF REPRISALS TO DETER TREACHERY MAY 
OBVIATE A CIVILIAN’S DUTY TO REFRAIN FROM 
PARTICIPATING IN HOSTILITIES 
This Part discusses the law and practice of conducting reprisals 
against civilians and explores the legality of using reprisals to stop 
treacherous conduct by insurgents.  Also discussed is the way social 
contractarian theory informs norms relative to reprisals and how this 
circumstance has the tendency to hinder rather than restore law and 
order within an occupied territory. 
A violation of IHL by insurgents or hostile civilians does not 
legally justify the commission of violations by occupiers.168  
Nevertheless, reprisals are considered an exception to that rule: they 
are self-help measures that would otherwise be unlawful but for their 
strict use to compel an adversary to cease illegitimate conduct.169  
Reprisals are employed to deter acts of illegitimate warfare, whether 
the acts are international violations or otherwise.170  Though at times 
reprisals may be an adequate means for making the enemy comply 
with IHL, they typically prompt counter-reprisals and their 
employment is often abused.171 
The qualifying standards for what objects are subject to reprisal 
attacks remains so narrow that the term reprisal has been erroneously 
used to describe conduct that does not qualify as a lawful reprisal.172  
The legal standards are very specific.  Reprisals may be employed 
only after all other means have been exhausted.173  They must be 
authorized by the commander-in-chief;174 proportional to the wrong 
committed by the enemy; committed by an actor against an addressee 
who are both “states or other entities enjoying a degree of 
 
 168. Id. at 90-91. 
 169. Andrew D. Mitchell, Does One Illegality Merit Another? The Law of Belligerent 
Reprisals in International Law, 170 Mil. L. Rev. 155, 156 (2001) (quoting The Naulilaa Case, 8 
Trib. Arb. Mixtes 422–25). 
 170. Lauterpacht, supra note 21, § 248, at 562-63. 
 171. Id. § 247, at 562; Iraq: Reprisal Killing of Civilian is War Crime, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, May 13, 2004, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/13/iraq8582.htm; Paul McGeough, 
Fallujah Braces for U.S. Reprisal, THE AGE, Apr. 3, 2004, available at 
http://www.theage.com.au/Articles/2004/04/02/1080544690212.html?from=storyrhs; Michael 
Gillespie, Reprisal in Fallujah, Apr. 15, 2004, http://world.mediamonitors.net/content/view/ 
full/6240. 
 172. W. Hays Parks, A Few Tools in the Prosecution of War Crimes, 149 MIL. L. REV. 73, 82-
83 (1995) (offering a list of items and individuals that nations have agreed are protected from 
reprisal). 
 173. Id. at 84. 
 174. Lauterpacht, supra note 21, § 250, at 564. 
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international personality;”175 and they must constitute acts, which 
amount to a violation of either the identical or another form of 
international law, but undertaken for the purpose of coercing the 
addressee to bring its conduct into compliance with IHL.176 
A. Legality of Reprisals against Civilians 
Unlike the state of jurisprudence that existed during the 
American Civil War, it is almost universally agreed that reprisals may 
not be exacted by taking hostages177 or killing prisoners of wars.178  
The legality of conducting reprisals against civilians, however, is not 
without dispute.  Admittedly, moral principle prompts questions 
regarding how just it is to punish civilians for acts they did not 
commit.  The prohibition contained in Article 50179 against levying 
punishment upon populations of civilians for the individual acts of 
others for which they cannot be held collectively responsible has not 
been interpreted to ban reprisals against civilians.180  It remains fairly 
undisputed that the Geneva Conventions do not ban “reprisals 
against enemy civil population.”181  Protocol I, however, attempts to 
ban reprisals against all civilians.182  The ban contained in Protocol I, 
though appearing to legally proscribe reprisals against civilians, does 
nothing of the sort in a practical sense. 
Major military powers such as Italy, Germany, Egypt, and the 
United Kingdom, despite ratifying Protocol I, have all reserved the 
right to resort to reprisals in the face of serious violations of IHL 
against their respective civilian populations.183  The United States is 
not a signatory to Protocol I and persistently objects to the portion of 
 
 175. FRITS KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISALS 33 (1971) [hereinafter BELLIGERENT 
REPRISALS]. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 13, arts. 27, 33, & 34. 
 178. Geneva Convention III, supra note 13, art. 13. 
 179. The Hague Regulations provide: “No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be 
inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals for which they can not be 
regarded as jointly and severally responsible.” HR, supra note 4, art. 50. 
 180. Lauterpacht, supra note 21, § 250, at 565; see also id. § 170, at 443. 
 181. BELLIGERENT REPRISALS, supra note 175, at 357; see also PICTET, supra note 53, at 67 
(endorsing the view that the Geneva Conventions prohibit reprisals only against protected 
persons, but permits them “in the conduct of hostilities”). 
 182. Protocol I, supra note 11, arts. 51(6), 52. 
 183. Shane Darcy, The Evolution of the Law of Belligerent Reprisals, 175 MIL. L. REV. 184, 
226-227 (2003); DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at 493-512. 
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Article 51 and subsequent Articles of Protocol I that ban reprisals.184  
According to U.S. policy, a viable means of combating treachery 
available for U.S. soldiers serving in U.S.-occupied territories is the 
use of reprisals185 against unprotected civilians.186 
At least one noted scholar, Fenrick, contends that certain 
reprisals are banned under international customary law,187 which binds 
the United States and other nations though they are not parties to 
Protocol I.188  I do not concur.  International customary law binds 
nations by functioning as a collection of widespread international 
practices that states over time come to accept as opinio juris, i.e., 
legally binding.189 States, by their acceptance and subsequent conduct, 
create international customary rules.190  Fenrick’s reliance on U.N. 
General Assembly and the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (I.C.T.Y.) sources regarding the state of 
international customary law, without discussion of a state’s official 
reservations or objections in shaping customary norms, ignore the 
notion that a state’s acceptance is a necessary condition for the 
progression of customary international law.191  Fenrick posits that 
 
 184. LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK, supra note 163, at 157; see Martin P. Dupuis et al., supra 
note 44, at 426. 
 185. United States military regulations make clear that reprisals may be taken against 
“enemy civilians” or “unprotected civilians,” which can logically be deduced to include the same 
category of civilians. See OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE, U.S. NAVY, ANNOTATED 
SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON NAVAL OPERATIONS, Ch. 6, § 6.2.3, at 6-
16, available at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/ILD/chapter6.pdf; see also FM 27-10, supra note 6, ¶ 
497(c), at 95-96 (allowing reprisals against unprotected civilians). 
 186. Geneva Convention IV identifies protected civilians as “those who, at a given moment 
and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands 
of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.” Geneva 
Convention IV, supra note 13, art. 4. U.S. military manuals explain that protected civilians fall 
into two categories. Using the U.S. occupation of Iraq as an illustration, the first category 
includes civilian enemy nationals within the national territory of each of the parties to the 
conflict, (e.g., U.S. oil workers in Iraq or Iraqi students in the U.S. after the start of the invasion 
on March 1, 2003).  The second category consists of the population of occupied territories, 
excluding nationals of the occupying power or a co-belligerent. See LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK, 
supra note 163, at 147–48. 
 187. Fenrick, supra note 128, at 557-559. 
 188. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also Martin P. Dupuis et al., 
supra note 44, at 420. 
 189. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1116 (1999). 
 190. Darcy, supra note 183, at 220. 
 191. Fenrick, supra note 128, at 557-58 (noting that “in view of the Appeals Chamber in the 
Tadic Jurisdiction motion, attack on civilian objects are prohibited as a matter of customary law 
in all conflicts and [that] this prohibition is reflected in U.N. Resolution 2675”); see also id. at 
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reprisals against civilian objects are prohibited as a matter of 
customary international law in all conflicts192 because U.N. Resolution 
2675193 suggests that reprisals against civilians in all circumstances are 
forbidden.194 
To support his position, Fenrick asserts that the legality of 
reprisal actions against civilians was considered and rejected by the 
I.C.T.Y in the matter of Prosecutor v. Martic,195 where the trial 
chamber agreed that the prohibitions against reprisals are an integral 
part of customary international law and are to be respected by all 
states during all armed conflicts.196  Fenrick’s propositions rest upon 
the notion that when international organs such as the U.N. General 
Assembly and the I.C.T.Y. concur that a norm is customary, the norm 
rises to the status of a customary rule of international law.197  To the 
extent Fenrick posits that the Martic decision is establishing 
international customary law, he departs from the majority view in 
several ways. 
First, the fact that the legality of reprisals was not an issue before 
the trial chambers in Martic makes that entity’s view obiter dicta,198 
and nonbinding on that basis alone.199  Second, the Martic decision 
does not bind objecting states.  Although the judgment of an 
international court construing customary international law binds the 
parties to the dispute, the court’s opinion does not have the effect of 
establishing precedent,200 particularly with respect to a state that has 
 
559 (stating “direct attacks on civilian objects would also constitute a violation of customary law 
in all conflicts.”). 
 192. Id. at 558-59 (citing Decision of Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v. Milan Martic, Case No. 
IT-95-11-I (1996)). 
 193. Basic principles for the protection of civilian populations in armed conflicts, G.A. Res. 
2675, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Vol. 13, U.N. Doc. A/8178 (Dec. 9, 1970). 
 194. Fenrick, supra note 128, at 558. 
 195. Prosecutor v. Marti , Case No. IT-95-11-R61, Decision of Trial Chamber I, (Mar. 8, 
1996) (Jorda, J., presiding). 
 196. Fenrick, supra note 128, at 558-59. 
 197. Id. at 557-59. 
 198. Obiter dicta is defined as an “incidental statement in a judgment; legal proposition 
which the judge does not consider necessary for reaching his decision and which therefore does 
not form part of the ratio decidendi.”  A. G. TOTH  THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 393 (1990). 
 199. See Darcy, supra note 183, at 241. 
 200. Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1492, 1527 (2004) (citing RESTATEMENT  (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 103, cmt. b (1987)) (recalling “the traditional view that there is no stare 
decisis in international law”); see also Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International 
01__JONES.DOC 8/1/2006  2:59 PM 
2006] CONDUCT IN IRAQ AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 287 
persistently objected to a rule and does not regard it as binding.201  
Because of the positivist characteristics of international law, states 
that “do not consent to being bound by treaty norms or to the 
development of customary rules . . . [are] not responsible to the 
international community for non-observance of [the norm].”202  
Therefore, a state that possesses certain weapon systems or employs 
specific measures of waging war that the rest of the world wishes to 
ban can prevent the development of a prohibition of those weapons 
and measures with respect to itself.203 
The same is true for U.N. General Assembly resolutions.  
Although U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2675 may represent 
persuasive authority,204 resolutions are generally not binding on states, 
and the value afforded it in assessing the formation of customary 
international law depends on a state’s acceptance thereof, its content, 
and its practice relative to the law.205  A state’s position regarding a 
certain treaty provision, as expressed through reservations, 
statements of interpretation, or implementation made upon 
ratification, is relevant in determining state practice and whether a 
particular rule can be considered an international customary law.206  
The reservations to Protocol I made by the United Kingdom,207 
 
Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in 
Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 175, 179 (2005). 
 201. Rex D. Glensy, Quasi-Global Social Norms, 38 CONN. L. REV. 79, 106 (2005) (noting 
that “customary international law is universal in the sense that its obligations bind all nations 
except those that ‘persistently object’ during the development of the customary international 
law norm” (quoting Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 189, at 1118-19)) . 
 202. Rupert Ticehurst, The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict, 317 INT’L REV. 
RED CROSS 125, 131 (1997). 
 203. Id. (relying on IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (4th 
ed. 1990)). 
 204. Shimon Shetreet, Negotiations and Agreements Are Better Than Legal Resolutions: A 
Response To Professor John Quigley, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 259, 265 (2000) (noting that 
United Nation General Assembly Resolutions may be persuasive of what international law 
should be). 
 205. Henckaerts, supra note 200, at 179. 
 206. See id. at 182-83. 
 207. See Protocol I, United Kingdom Reservation, reservation m, available at 
http://www.icrc.ch/IHL.nsf/NORM/0A9E03F0F2EE757CC1256402003FB6D2?OpenDocument 
(“The obligations of Articles 51 and 55 are accepted on the basis that any adverse party against 
which the United Kingdom might be engaged will itself scrupulously observe those obligations. 
If an adverse party makes serious and deliberate attacks, in violation of Article 51 or Article 52 
against the civilian population or civilians or against civilian objects, or, in violation of Articles 
53, 54 and 55, on objects or items protected by those Articles, the United Kingdom will regard 
itself as entitled to take measures otherwise prohibited by the Articles in question to the extent 
that it considers such measures necessary for the sole purpose of compelling the adverse party 
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Italy,208 Germany,209 and Egypt,210 and the objections of the United 
States can, therefore, be said to be an exercise of their right not to be 
bound by any attempt to ban reprisals.  This fact militates against any 
argument that reprisals against civilians are banned under 
international customary law, particularly with respect to these 
objecting states.211 
It should be noted that some commentators assert that 
international customary law binds all other states that did not 
“’persistently object’ during the development of the . . . norm.”212  
Additionally, there are universally accepted crimes of aggression that 
can be described as peremptory norms that bind all states.213  
Reprisals, however, have never been so characterized by the 
international community,214 which explains why even the historic 
guardian of international humanitarian efforts, the International 
 
to cease committing violations under those Articles, but only after formal warning to the 
adverse party requiring cessation of the violations has been disregarded and then only after a 
decision taken at the highest level of government.”). 
 208. See Protocol I, Italy Declaration, available at http://www.icrc.ch/IHL.nsf/NORM/ 
E2F248CE54CF09B5C1256402003FB443?OpenDocument (“Italy will react to serious and 
systematic violations by an enemy of the obligations imposed by Additional Protocol I and in 
particular its Articles 51 and 52 with all means admissible under international law in order to 
prevent any further violation.”). 
 209. See Protocol I, Germany Reservation, para. 6, available at http://www.icrc.ch/ 
ihl.nsf/NORM/259D4F9EF25B0E95C1256402003FB8C0?OpenDocument (“The Federal 
Republic of Germany will react against serious and systematic violations of the obligations 
imposed by Additional Protocol I and in particular its Articles 51 and 52 with all means 
admissible under international law in order to prevent any further violation.”). 
 210. See Protocol I, Egypt Declaration, available at http://www.icrc.ch/ihl.nsf/NORM/ 
47930B6388C46B08C1256402003FB884?OpenDocument (“The Arab Republic of Egypt, while 
declaring its commitment to respecting all the provisions of Additional Protocols I and II, 
wishes to emphasize, on the basis of reciprocity, that it upholds the right to react against any 
violation by any party of the obligations imposed by Additional Protocols I and II with all 
means admissible under international law in order to prevent any further violation.”). 
 211. Questions remain as to whether a finding that reprisals are legally banned under 
international customary law would actually prevent U.S. forces from employing them. The U.S. 
Army military manual on land warfare makes clear that while customary law is strictly observed 
by United States forces, it is subject to “such exceptions as shall have been directed by 
competent authority by way of legitimate reprisals for illegal conduct of the enemy.”  FM 27-10, 
supra note 6, ¶¶ 7a, 7c, at 10-11. 
 212. Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 189, at 1118-19. 
 213. Benjamin Ferencz, Can Aggression Be Deterred by Law?, 11 PACE INT’L L. REV. 344, 
349 (1999). 
 214. Frank Emmert, Labor, Environment, Standards and World Trade Law, 10  U.C. DAVIS 
J. INT’L L. & POL’Y, 75, 90, n.39 (2003) (recognizing that reprisals may be lawful so long as they 
do not violate “peremptory rules of international law (jus cogens)”). 
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Coalition of the Red Cross, recognizes that reprisals, albeit limited, 
are not prohibited under international customary law.215 
B. The Empirical Effect of Using Reprisals 
One of the most difficult tasks for a field commander facing an 
enemy that violates the most fundamental laws of war is fashioning a 
humane, but effective, way to stop the proscribed conduct, while 
preserving humanitarian value systems.216  Sometimes the need to 
obtain this balance requires a departure from accepted means of 
conduct.217  Therefore, reprisals seem especially useful for a 
commander faced with enforcing the laws and customs of armed 
conflict.  A French military general once stated that reprisals will 
“never disappear, because the laws of war are the laws of necessity, 
and it will always be necessary to repress acts of treachery, of bad 
faith and of vengeance.”218  Indeed, this was the conclusion reached 
during the American Civil War by General Robert E. Lee, 
commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, after being informed 
by one of his subordinate commanders that six of his men had been 
captured and hanged in violation of the law and customs of war.219 
Lieutenant Colonel John Mosby advised General Lee of his 
intent to conduct reprisals in response to illegal conduct perpetrated 
against his men.220  General Lee’s response could not have been more 
 
 215. Henckaerts, supra note 200, at 210 (recognizing, via Rule 145 of the 2005 customary law 
study, that belligerent reprisals are not legally prohibited but are subject to stringent 
conditions); see also ZEGVELD, supra note 43, at 92 (recognizing that international 
humanitarian law does not expressly prohibit nor permit reprisals). 
 216. WALZER, supra note 56, at 304 (recognizing that judgments relative to 
“proportionality” and the “usefulness” are “very difficult for soldiers in the field”). 
 217. Id. at 208-09 (recognizing that French partisans forces killed 80 German prisoners as a 
means to stop the German army from executing captured partisans). 
 218. KARMA NABULSI, TRADITIONS OF WAR: OCCUPATION, RESISTANCE, AND THE LAW 
31 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (quoting GENERAL « T » (BRIALMONT), ANGLETERRE ET LES 
PETITS ÉTATS 65 (Brussals: C. Muquardt, Librarie Militaire 1875)). 
 219. John S. Mosby, Retaliation. The Execution of Seven Prisoners: A Self Protective 
Necessity, RICHMOND, VA TIMES, Sept. 3, 1899, repinted. in 27 SOUTHERN HISTORICAL 
SOCIETY PAPERS 314, 316-317 (1899). 
 220. Lieutenant Colonel John Mosby wrote: “General, I desire to bring, through you, to the 
notice of the government the brutal conduct of the enemy manifested towards citizens of this 
district since their occupation of Manassas road . . . .  [W]e smashed up one of their trains, 
killing and wounding a large number. In retaliation, they arrested a large number of citizens 
living along the line and have been in the habit of sending an installment of them on each train. 
As my command has done nothing contrary to the usage of war, it seems to me that some 
attempt at least ought to be made to prevent a repetition of such barbarities.  During my 
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demonstrative of the reciprocal nature of armed conflict and a 
combatants’ willingness to use reprisals when they believe an 
adversary has breached a duty owed to them: “[r]espectfully referred 
to the Honorable Secretary of War for his information. I do not know 
how we can prevent the cruel conduct of the enemy towards our 
citizen[ry].  I have directed Colonel Mosby . . . to hang an equal 
number of Custer’s men in retaliation for those executed by him.”221  
Mosby explained afterward that the reprisal was not an act of revenge 
but a judicial sentence222 intended to save lives, not only those of his 
men but also those of his enemy.  Because of his actions, no more of 
his men were hanged, but Mosby was remorseful for having to resort 
to reprisals: “I regret that fate thrust such a duty upon me.”223 
The Mosby experience illustrates that combatants may, despite 
their desire for the humane conduct of a war, overlook certain rules 
of armed conflict or undertake reprisals when they believe the other 
party’s breach of legal obligations has freed them from their own 
legal obligations.  While some commentators warn that the 
application of IHL should never be subject to conditions or operate 
as if the duty under IHL is contractarian in nature, they acknowledge 
that combatants often condition their obligations during hostilities 
upon their adversary’s compliance with certain military or political 
conditions.224  Although not immediately discernible by some 
observers, contract theory has influenced normative values during 
armed conflict since the beginning of the United States’ participation 
in war.225 
For instance, when the British army captured American 
revolutionaries in 1776, General Washington was informed that as 
deserters from the British army, his men could not be considered 
prisoners of war.226  “It was only the fear of reprisal against British 
prisoners captured by the American revolutionaries” that caused the 
British army to spare the lives of General Washington’s men.227  The 
 
absence . . . the enemy captured six of my men.  They were immediately hanged . . . .  It is my 
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 222. The form of reprisal Mosby exacted is now illegal.  See Geneva Convention III, supra 
note 13, art. 13 (stating “[m]easures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited”). 
 223. Mosby, supra note 219, at 316-17. 
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existential aspects of contract theory have continued to remain 
characteristic of armed conflict even in modern times. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, Israel launched a series of attacks 
against the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) reportedly 
based in Lebanon.228  Although Israeli attacks failed to achieve full 
deterrence, “[t]he rate of PLO attacks against Israel from Lebanon 
was far below the organization’s capability.”229  The PLO’s decision to 
refrain from conducting attacks commensurate with their capabilities 
reflected their unwillingness to invoke a certain magnitude of Israeli 
response.230  Though the PLO was willing to suffer losses during its 
armed struggle as the cost of pursuing what it believed to be 
important political values, “it did not want to lose its territory in 
Lebanon, which was very important for its political and 
organizational independence.”231  The social condition amounted to 
an agreement, albeit conceptual, “through which the level of the 
PLO’s terrorist activity was maintained below the threshold that 
would, by the [PLO’s] assessment, trigger a massive Israeli 
response.”232  Israel, though capable, did not launch any massive 
response until the fragile balance was broken.233  Indeed, the Israeli 
government has always classified the PLO members as “terrorists” on 
the grounds that “they neither belong to a party to the conflict, nor 
conduct their operations in accordance” with IHL, and thus, “are not 
entitled to privileged treatment in accordance with the Third Geneva 
Convention.”234  Despite this position, the Israeli government has 
generally treated Palestinians as prisoners-of-war.235  Put differently, 
each party performs or refrains from conduct of which it is capable in 
exchange for the other party’s like consideration so long as they 
perceive that an optimal balance is being attained. 
The British army’s capitulation and subsequent disregard of its 
own policy of considering the American revolutionaries deserters, 
Mosby’s reprisal, and the Israeli-PLO conflict all exemplify the socio-
contractarian aspect of the relationship between adversaries during 
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armed conflict.  That is to say, there exists a social agreement 
between adversaries that supplies the normative blueprint for an ideal 
set of conditions that shapes individual behavior within the conflict.  
The socio-contractarian commitment largely emanates from the 
dictates of rationality and self interest.  The examples discussed above 
not only confirm the useful effects of reprisals, they validate the 
practical dimensions of social contractarian theory.  Though socio-
contractarian thought processes have remained characteristic of 
armed conflict for some time, the use of reprisals, despite their 
attractiveness and apparent utility, impedes coherency between the 
principle justification of IHL and the outcome produced by its 
application, particularly when dealing with insurgencies or opposition 
movements. 
The German army’s attempt to quell the insurgency in 
Independent Croatia between 1941 and 1944 helps illustrate the 
detrimental effects of reprisals.236  During the 1940s, a German 
occupying force was charged with eliminating partisan opposition to 
the Axis Powers.237  The German commander’s resort to repeated 
reprisals against the civilian population only generated support for 
the Partisans.238  The Partisans became so strong that the German 
army was unable to subdue the Partisans, who, in turn, ultimately 
gained control of half of Independent Croatia.239  Similarly, Israel has 
also widely employed reprisals with very little deterrent effects.  
Indeed, for over half a century, Israel has adhered to a policy of 
reprisal, largely to no avail.240  Its Arab neighbors have continued to 
sponsor or permit terrorist activity, while Israel has struck at military 
and civilian targets in the sponsoring country with no material 
reduction in the rate of terrorist attacks despite the loss of civilian 
lives.241 
Turning to the opening scenario, it does not appear that the 
hypothetical helicopter pilot’s conduct in destroying the building 
could have qualified as a lawful reprisal, for at least two reasons.  As 
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noted, reprisals are exacted against other nations or international 
actors.  The insurgents in the scenario do not represent a state and are 
not recognized international belligerents.  Instead, they are persons 
engaged in hostilities committed by unlawful means.  Second, 
reprisals are actions that would otherwise be unlawful but for the 
enemy’s breach of international law.242  As previously stated, the 
pilot’s destruction of the building to end the attack upon the trapped 
soldiers was justified by the military necessity of the circumstances.  It 
was, therefore, a legal response and would not qualify as a reprisal.  
Based on these two conditions alone, it is doubtful that the helicopter 
pilot’s attack on the building in the opening scenario could legally 
qualify as a reprisal.  Therefore, if the destruction of the building had 
not been required by military necessity, the pilot’s action would likely 
have amounted to a war crime. 
Though the destruction of the building was a purely defensive 
maneuver aimed at saving the lives of the British team, it was not 
construed in that fashion.  One problem faced by occupying powers is 
that too often their lawful responses to attacks are viewed as reprisals 
or retaliations, and, thus, produce outcomes that are incoherent with 
the justification for IHL.  As the German army experienced in 
Croatia, public outrage and condemnation may create support for the 
insurgency.243  The circumstance evolves primarily from the civilian 
populace’s perception that they are either the object of attack or the 
occupier is powerless to protect them from attack.244 
This condition undermines the logic supporting the proscription 
against civilian direct participation in hostilities and weakens the 
social contract between civilians and the occupier.  The legal right of 
the civilian to be free from attack is the legal duty of the occupier, 
and, vice versa.245  If peaceful civilians have the right to be free from 
attack, then they do not have the right to conduct attacks.  Few would 
deny that there is also a human right that arises from our nature as 
human beings that entitles an individual to certain conduct from all 
others.246  It is comparable to a “contractual right” imposed upon 
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others to refrain from acting in a certain way.247  Hence, the 
agreement not to kill, albeit implicit, is the condition precedent to 
peaceful conduct.248 
Applying this reasoning, when civilians perceive themselves to be 
attacked or harmed, they may view such conduct as a breach of the 
occupier’s duty to refrain from targeting or harming civilians.  As a 
result, the civilians may deem themselves freed from their duty to 
refrain from participating in hostilities and may begin to engage in 
hostilities.249That is to say, even if there is a duty of obedience or an 
obligation to comply with IHL, the moral preeminence of the socio-
contractarian influences on conduct may cause the civilian to deem 
themselves excused from their obligation to obey the law or refrain 
from hostilities.  The circumstance can be said to be akin to a 
condition in which a promisor deems himself excused from 
performing if a promisee breaches his duty to perform under the 
contractual theories related to justification for nonperformance or 
impracticability.  Succinctly stated, despite the mandates of IHL, the 
socio-contractarian aspect of armed conflict tends to supersede a 
person’s value for the law during occupation and armed conflict.  
Practical reasoning, therefore, suggests that it is beneficial for the 
occupier and international lawyers to recognize the influence of 
socio-contractarian theory upon conduct during armed conflict so as 
to avoid juridical gaps in the law that create incoherency and enable 
conditions that hinder IHL’s justification and impede the restoration 
of law and order in occupied territories. 
Despite an occupier’s recognition of the socio-contractarian 
nature of armed conflict, the challenge for the occupier is that the 
perception of the civilian populace is typically not gleaned from close 
examination of the facts or obligations of IHL.  Rather, the 
perceptions of civilians and other observers are informed by media 
coverage and propaganda.  This condition suggests that it is vital that 
the occupier manage the public’s perception of its conduct just as 
carefully and critically as it manages its actual conduct during the 
occupation. Educating the civilian populace on the customs and laws 
 
 247. See id. at 20-21. 
 248. See id. at 20. 
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of armed conflict may also be helpful.  The task of managing 
perception requires more attention today than it did during the 
Vietnam War, because of the advances in media technology and the 
media’s ability to broadcast to large numbers of people in short 
periods of time. Perhaps the need for perception management 
explains why the U.S. news media have been reportedly biased in 
their coverage of the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq.250 
Though there are some indications that coverage was indeed 
biased, there is also evidence that the United States is doing what it 
can to comply with IHL.  Despite these efforts, the amount of 
casualties resulting from the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq—an arena 
rife with insurgent activity—strongly suggests the advent of total war 
and demonstrates incoherency between the application of IHL and its 
justification—of minimizing the impact of war upon the innocent 
civilian populace.  The impact of the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq upon 
the civilian populace could not be more justifying of a proper juridical 
model. 
Research by scientists, including scholars from Johns Hopkins 
Bloomsberg School of Public Health251 and Columbia University,252 
indicates that since the United States’ invasion of Iraq in March 2003, 
approximately 100,000 people have been killed253 and that more than 
half of the dead were women and children.254  Granted, many people 
doubt the legitimacy of the number of reported civilian deaths.  The 
credibility of the study appears strong given that most independent 
studies, including research conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau 
estimate that the number of Iraqi civilian deaths in the comparatively 
much shorter Gulf War in Iraq also exceeded 100,000.255  
Notwithstanding criticism, the study not only challenges the 
credibility of the usefulness of IHL, but also raises the question of 
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whether we have now approached the level of “total” war witnessed 
in the 1940s, which led to the deaths of nearly 1 million civilians, 
including 600,000 in Germany and 360,000 in Japan.256 
The current deaths did not occur because of ignorance of the law 
or a blanket refusal to obey its conditions.  Rather, the harm to the 
civilian populace emanates from the incoherent and contradictory 
construct of Protocol I, which exists principally due to a concerted 
inability among some nations to appreciate the socio-contractarian 
aspects of armed conflict and the need for absolute coherency 
between Protocol I’s justification and the means to achieve it. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has asserted that, due to incoherence between IHL’s 
underlying justification and its construct, Protocol I is ill-suited to 
achieve its goal of protecting innocent civilians during armed conflict.  
Despite the obvious obstacles that insurgencies pose to the 
restoration of law and order within an occupied territory and the 
resulting harm to the civilian populace that is largely attributed to 
identification problems during hostilities, there has been a regression 
in juridical requirements historically designed to distinguish 
combatants from civilians.  The weakening of distinction 
requirements in favor of insurgents and the lack of juridical precision 
regarding the definitional standard for civilian status are 
contradictory to IHL justification and has a deadly effect on peaceful 
civilians and occupying forces alike.  The overly broad definition of 
the term civilian, under Protocol I, compromises the conceptual 
purity of civilian identity, because it arguably can be read to grant 
immunity to those persons who are not part of an armed conflict 
while authorizing them to engage in hostilities and later rejoin the 
civilian populace.  This condition compels occupiers to presume that 
all civilians are hostile until they act otherwise, and undermining the 
authority and credibility of IHL. 
This Article has explained how the doctrine of military necessity 
and socio-contractarian aspects of armed conflict may impede the 
restoration of law and order during occupations by compelling 
occupiers to apply the law based predominantly on considerations of 
self-preservation and military necessity, rather than humanitarian 
imperatives.  Indeed, it defies moral reason to expect an occupier to 
weigh heavily the harm to innocent civilians under a system of law 
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that encourages insufficient distinction standards between a hostile 
person and an innocent civilian, while requiring an occupier to 
acquire absolute certainty of a person’s true status before defending 
against a threat.  Indeed, it is doubtful that any legal argument could 
persuade an occupying commander to weigh, proportionately and 
appropriately, the welfare of civilians against the demands of military 
necessity when that commander has been deprived of humanitarian 
protections under law, while the noncompliant insurgent enjoys 
increased juridical protection. 
The mandates of coherency demand that Protocol I be 
interpreted to prevent conduct that leads to the type of tragedy 
described in the opening scenario.  Once a territory is occupied, 
within the context of IHL, a civilian’s duty to refrain from 
participating in hostilities must be absolute. There must be a clear 
prohibition under IHL against any conduct that impedes or 
compromises an occupying force’s ability to distinguish insurgents 
from peaceful civilians so as to preserve innocent lives.  Civilian 
immunity should permanently evaporate when civilians engage in 
hostilities, or aid and abet anyone who engages in hostilities, against 
the occupier.  Violations of these requirements should make the 
violator subject to penal laws, rather than reprisals, which tend to 
lead towards indiscriminate or total war rather than inspire humane 
conduct.  Such modifications would make the fruit vendors that sent 
the British soldiers to the taxicab loaded with explosives liable for 
war crimes, which, one must hope, would deter such conduct. 
These recommendations are not intended to suggest that civilians 
should swear an oath of allegiance to the occupier.  Rather, they arise 
from an overarching need for coherency between the law and the 
practical means to achieve its justification—a measure crucial to 
avoiding a total form of war in occupied territories.  That said, the 
influences of contract theory upon behavior during armed conflict 
cannot be ignored.  Occupiers must be ever mindful of the way their 
conduct informs norms within the civilian community as they weigh 
the military value of an attack against the collateral harm to the 
civilian populace so that they do not undermine the justification of 
IHL, or offend the socio-contractarian balance.  Perceived reprisals 
against innocent civilians or disproportionate military attacks 
constitute, at least by implication, a breach of the occupiers duty to 
protect civilians that, in turn, may justify a civilian deeming himself 
free from the legal obligation to refrain from participating in 
hostilities. 
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Simply put, IHL, as a result of Protocol I, leaves itself too 
vulnerable to socio-political influences.  IHL must be read and 
applied so that the application and interpretation of its mandate is 
coherent with the outcome achieved by its application.  
Interpretations or applications that lead to increased civilians 
casualties are inconsistent with the juridical aim of IHL.  Without the 
implementation of coherency from end to appropriate means, total or 
indiscriminate war is inevitable. 
